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Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea:
A Legal and Strategic Theory for

Naval Anti-Piracy Operations
Michael Bahar*
ABSTRACT

On January 21, 2006, a guided missile destroyer
accomplished the U.S. Navy's first capture of suspected pirates
in recent memory. As the Staff Judge Advocate for the NASSAU
Strike Group, the Author advised the seizure, led the onboard
* Michael Bahar, a Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy, was the Staff Judge Advocate for
the NASSAU Strike Group between April 2005 and June 2006. Prior to that
assignment, he was a prosecutor at the Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. He
received his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2002, his M.Phil in International
Relations from Cambridge University in 1998, and his B.A. in Political Science from
Yale University in 1997. He was also a litigation associate at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP in New York City before being called to active duty in June
2003 and was an adjunct professor in International Relations at the University of
North Florida. He would like to thank Rory Berke, Andru Wall, and Bill Burke-White
for their invaluable assistance with this Article. He would also like to thank his
family, James W. Houck, Martin Allard, Charles Berdar, Brian Wilson, Greg Belonger,
Steve Holland, Vida Antolin-Jenkins, Joseph Baggett, Jesse Gruter, Bob Sproull, and
James Burns.
This paper is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, Sam Berger, who passed
away while I was deployed and working on this paper. To borrow the words of Albert
Camus, my grandfather was a man who truly compiled his life so that he should not be
one of those who "hold their peace but should bear witness in favor of those plaguestricken people; so that some memorial of the injustice and outrage done them might
endure; and to state quite simply what we learn in time of pestilence: that there are
more things to admire in men than to despise."
The views expressed in this paper are the Author's own. They do not necessarily
represent the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Navy, or any of its
components. Approved for public release, Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2), 06-402,
Aug. 21, 2006.
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investigation, oversaw the shipboarddetentions, and testified at
the trial in Kenya.
Drawing upon this experience, the Author constructs a
comprehensive legal and strategic theory for piracy, defining the
legal status of pirates and deriving the due process rights that
should be afforded them.
The Article also analyzes the evolution of customary and
positive international law to demonstrate that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, sufficient international law exists to
counter the reemergence of piracy. It is sufficient to tackle the
growing threat of piraticalterrorism as well.
Finally, given the state of internationallaw and the status
of pirates as international maritime criminals, the Author
argues that the United States should initiate seven domestic
reforms and two regional reforms to achieve "optimal
deterrence," a naval posture sufficiently robust to minimize the
economic, environmental, and humanitarian costs of piracy
through strong multi-lateral and unilateral deterrence efforts,
while maximizing the due process rights for detained
individuals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have
learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears
for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture or
linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks and
bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane
and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send
1
them to die in a happy city.

On January 21, 2006, fifty-four nautical miles off the coast of
Somalia, the U.S. Navy caught its first band of suspected pirates in
recent memory. Ten Somali pirates had attacked an Indian dhow
from three speedboats five days earlier, swarming the Indian vessel
in the early morning hours and causing paralyzing fear with AK-47
bursts and shouldered rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers.
The Indian navigator reported that once onboard, the pirates
herded the crewmembers into groups. They punctuated otherwise
unintelligible orders with blows from the butts of the AK-47s and
rusty pistols. The pirates made the sixteen crewmembers cook for
them and directed that they take the dhow further out to sea to hunt
for larger ships. It was the third of these attacks, against the motor
2
vessel Delta Ranger, which proved their undoing.
On January 20, the Delta Ranger reported shots fired from a
dhow and three speedboats in tow. The ship managed to escape, and

1.

ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 278 (Stuart Gilbert trans., Alfred K. Knopf

1948) (1947).

2.
Ed Jones, Somali Pirates Gets Jail Sentence in Kenya, KENYA LONDON
NEWS NETWORK, available at http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?click-id=68&artid=
qw1162371420813B252&set_id=.
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the U.S. Navy was called to intercept the alleged assailants. After
launching helicopters, broadcasting warnings, and firing warning
shots, the USS WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, a guided missile
destroyer attached to the NASSAU Strike Group, managed to capture
the pirates. Eight days later, the USS NASSAU flew the suspected
pirates from its deck to Mombasa, Kenya, where their trial for piracy
began. In October 2006, the ten Somalis were convicted of piracy and
sentenced to seven years in Kenyan prison.
Three months after apprehending the ten pirates, NASSAU
Strike Group assets engaged thirteen other suspected pirates, killing
one and wounding five others in a high seas firefight that began when
3
the suspects raised their weapons against the warships.
Like Camus' plague, piracy has skulked behind cliffs and within
coves for the past century, always present yet ever patient, biding its
time before re-emerging with renewed fury. According to the Londonbased International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there were 329 reported
cases of piracy worldwide in 2004. 4 In 2005 the number of reported
cases actually dropped 16%, due in part to increased naval presence,
but there was also a marked increase (from two to thirty-five reported
attacks) in the number of piratical attacks off the anarchic and
violent coast of Somalia. 5 Additionally, a total of twenty-three vessels
were hijacked in 2005, the highest in four years, and 440
crewmembers were taken hostage, the highest number since IMB
started compiling statistics in 1992.6 And these attacks are not at all
like the romanticized swashbuckling of Hollywood buccaneers.
Rather, they are often as brutal and sad as the lands from which
these pirates hail.
While crews are beaten, sometimes killed, and often held hostage
for long periods of time for ransom, the global economic consequences
are similarly dire and extend far beyond the small dhows and cargo
The IMB estimates that piracy costs
ships actually attacked.
transport vessels $13-15 billion a year in losses in the waters between
the Pacific and Indian oceans alone. 7 Small cargo dhows, for example,

In April 2006, however, after a six-week investigation and afloat detention,
3.
the decision was made to repatriate to Somalia via Mombasa rather than prosecute.
In part because there was insufficient evidence to convict these individuals of piracy
vice armed assault upon federal officers, this Article will rely far more extensively upon
the Safina al Bisarat incident for insights and examples.
4.

ICC INT'L MAR. BUREAU, PIRAcY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS 16

(2006) [hereinafter 2005 PIRACY REPORT] (finding that "the total number of worldwide
reported attacks dropped to 276 compared to 329 in 2004").
5.
Id. The Report also indicates that after the Tsunami, no reports were filed
for two months. Id. at 15. Such a lack of reported incidents could also be the result of
a decrease in the number of piracies. Id. at 16.
Id.
6.
7.
Margaret Ryan, Captain Counts the Cost of Piracy, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/4669050.stm.
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are extending their routes to remain at least 200 miles off Somalia's
east coast per IMB's guidance.8 They have complained that the excess
fuel and opportunity costs associated with "the long route" are
crippling, tempting some to cut corners, gambling against the house
with their lives. 9 While the chilling effect on international trade is
substantial, pirates have also begun to directly target tourists. In
November 2005, passengers on the cruise ship Seabourne Spirit
described the horrors as Somali pirates in speedboats attacked them
with AK-47 bursts and shouldered RPG launchers.10
Worse is the potential for piratical terrorism. As one
commentator has warned, "[j]ust as terrorists learned to be pilots for
9/11, terrorists may now be learning to be pirates."'" Citing the
example of the March 2003 hijacking of the chemical tanker Dewi
Madrim in which the Indonesian-speaking attackers "seemed
primarily interested in practicing to steer the ship down the
congested waterway," Burnett has noted that intentionally grounding
a crude carrier hauling 2 million barrels of oil at a place like Batu
Berhanti, where the Straits of Malacca are a mere 1.5 miles wide,
would close the waterway indefinitely. 12 The resultant "delay in oil
supplies to China, Japan, and South Korea could devastate their
'13
economies, setting off a global economic crisis.
Unlike prosecutions for crimes against humanity, the fight
against piracy is occurring every day. Unlike traditional naval
battles, maritime security operations (MSOs) of the counter-terrorism
and law enforcement variety are the way of the present and future.

8.
2005 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 4, at 15; see also Pirate Attacks Ease
Worldwide in 2005, MALAYSIA STAR, Jan. 31, 2006, available at http://thestar.com.my/
news/story.asp?file=200611/l31/nationI20060131110121&sec=nation.
9.
Interview with First Mate of the Safina al Bisarat,onboard USS NASSAU
(LHA 4) (Jan. 22, 2006).
10.
Matt Cherry & Amanda Moyer, Cruise Liner Outruns Armed Pirate Boats,
CNN.coM, Nov. 5, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005WORLD/africa/11/05/somalia.
pirates/.
11.
John S. Burnett, Op-Ed., The Next 9/11 Could Happen at Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2005, at A17; see also Dan Ephron, Terror on the High Seas: Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia is a Growing Concern, But Al Qaeda Could Make a Big Problem Much
Bigger, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 11, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
12213087/site/newsweek/from/ET/.
12.

Ephron, supra note 11; see also WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA:

A WORLD OF FREEDOM, CHAOS AND CRIME 47-48 (2004) (arguing that a maritime
terrorist attack using merchant ships poses the "most serious threat to national
security"); cf. Charles N. Dragonette, Lost at Sea, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at
174 (arguing that there was "no evidence" that the Dewi Madrim affair was a terrorist
attack). Regardless of whether it was, in fact, a terrorist attack, the hijacking should
nevertheless highlight the frightening capabilities and potential for one. This Article
will not seek to prove a nexus in individual cases, but will demonstrate that the law,
contrary to the opinions of many authors, supports essential maritime security
operations against both piracy and maritime terrorism.
13.
Burnett, supra note 11.
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Thus, legal theories are needed, just as much as are the strategic
options that flow from them.
What follows, therefore, is just such a legal and strategic theory
for piracy, closing a serious gap. As the first point of order, it is
crucial to recognize that contrary to the assertions of many
commentators, authors, and practitioners, sufficient international
law exists to enable the military and diplomats to counter piracy, as
well as its more virulent strain of piratical terrorism. The first two
Sections of this Article comprehensively explore the crime of piracy
and piratical terrorism and stress that few, if any, legal changes need
to occur at the international level to effectively combat the problems.
Most important, this Article demonstrates that terrorism on the high
seas can equal piracy under international law.
On the domestic front, this Article advocates a series of domestic
reforms that reside at the intersection of international and domestic
law and at the crossroads of law and strategy. Most critical, Part III
defines the legal status of pirates and the optimal set of rights that
flow from that status.
Pirates are not combatants or enemy prisoners of war, but they
are international maritime criminals entitled to international and
constitutional due process protections while in U.S. custody. Overall,
the defined status and proposed reforms will increase the overall
efficacy of anti-piracy efforts while maximizing the rights of those
captured.
Part IV offers a pair of regional solutions, again taking the
established state of international law as a given. First, the United
States must promote regional security arrangements consisting of not
only coordinated patrols, but joint patrols as well. Second, the United
States should advance a regional court to prosecute pirates on the
basis of universal jurisdiction. These specialized courts would acquire
the necessary expertise and resources, the appropriate rules of
evidence, and would exploit such economies of scale for efficient and
just prosecution throughout affected regions, while helping spread
the value and example of the rule of law.
Ultimately, this Article calls for a regime of optimal deterrence, a
determined point between the poles of maximum military pursuit and
neglect. International law will support a robust high seas military
presence coupled with domestic prosecutions that will deter pirates
and thereby save the industry vast sums of money and mariners their
lives. It will also help protect the seas from the disastrous economic,
political, environmental, and humanitarian consequences of piratical
terrorism.
But optimal deterrence argues that too aggressive a military and
investigatory response will actually increase both the costs and the
dangers of piracy. First, it will diminish the prospects of effective
prosecution. If in the effort to deter pirates and to crack the piratical
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enterprise of modern piracy domestic and international due process
rights are not respected, nations will reject U.S. efforts to turn over
seized pirates for prosecution, and courts, including U.S. courts, will
likely suppress evidence derived.
Second, excess militarily and investigatory zeal will cause
coalition flight. While there is much the United States as preeminent
naval power can accomplish, the only key to successful maritime
security over the vast oceans is multilateralism. As the President's
National Strategy for Maritime Security rightfully concludes:
Even an enhanced national effort is not sufficient. The challenges that
remain ahead for the United States, the adversaries we confront, and
the environment in which we operate compel us to strengthen our ties
with allies and friends and to seek new partnerships with others.
Therefore, international cooperation is critical to ensuring that lawful
private and public activities in the maritime domain are protected from
14
attack and hostile or unlawful exploitation.

Few governments will join what the Chief of Naval Operations calls
the "proverbial 1000-ship Navy" comprised of many nations, 15 if the
United States is perceived, in yet another arena, as unduly
aggressive. 16 On the other hand, a strategy that is less aggressive
but multilateral will be far more effective.
Third, too great a military presence and too aggressive an
investigative policy will prove counter-productive by fueling an antiAmerican ire that has proven the lifeblood of international terrorists.
Somalia, Indonesia, and Malaysia are overwhelmingly Muslim. 17
Anti-Americanism born of excess U.S. aggression into other relatively
poor, predominantly Muslim regions increases the number of
extremists who can be recruited into violent movements such as al
Qaeda.

14.
DEP'T OF DEF. & HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME
SECURITY 25 (2005) [hereinafter THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY].
15.
Christopher P. Cavas, New U.S. Navy Chief Wants "1,000-Ship"
InternationalNavy, DEFENSENEWS.COM, Aug. 28, 2006, http://www.defensenews.comI
story.php?F=107671 l&C=navwar.
16.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 1,
2005, at 105 (arguing that when "foreign populations disapprove of U.S. policy and are
fearful of U.S. dominance, their governments are less likely to endorse Washington's
initiatives and more likely to look for ways to hinder them").
17.

CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2006), available at

https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (finding Muslim the majority
religious group in Somalia, Indonesia and Malaysia).

8
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Optimal deterrence can be conceptualized as follows:
P

D

F

F
P
D
C

C

F

F

As the charts above illustrate, the level of naval force (F) is
inversely proportional to the costs to international commerce of
piracy (P). 1 8 The more pronounced a military presence in an area, the
more shipping will move freely through the areas and transit costs
will decrease. Even scaling back the 200-mile bubble around Somalia
to its territorial seas of twelve nautical miles, for example, will save
merchant vessels significant transit time, food and fuel costs, wages,
and other opportunity costs. Insurance premiums would abate as
well. 19 The dangers of piracy and maritime terrorism (D) will also
decrease with a stronger military presence.
In July 2005, for
example, Indonesia launched an offensive known as "Gurita 2005"
which, according to the IMB, accounted for its "dramatic reduction" in

18.
For purposes of this Article, the costs of U.S. naval patrols will be held as
fixed. Unless additional assets are deployed specifically for counter-piracy operations,
vessels already scheduled for deployments will simply be tasked within that
deployment to patrol piracy areas. The costs of naval patrols for other countries, as
well as ways to reduce U.S. counter-piracy costs, however, will be discussed.
19.
The Straits of Malacca were added to Lloyd's Market Association Joint War
Committee (JWC) War Risk List in June of 2005, placing them in the same category as
Somalia, Iraq, and Lebanon. Underwriters now have the discretion of charging extra
premiums for vessels operating in the straits. In January 2006, the committee noted
the significant security improvements in the Straits region but nevertheless stated that
it was still too soon to know if the improvements were long-term or simply a short-term
fix. In August 2006, in response to tri-lateral efforts, see infra note 373 and
accompanying text, the Straits were taken off the list. See James Brewer, Malacca
Straight Declared a High Risk Zone by Joint War Committee Casualty, LLOYD'S LIST,
July 1, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.the-lma.com/Doclmages/5353.htm (finding
the Malacca straight "one of the world's busiest shipping lanes" and asserting the new
guidelines to underwriters will "give them more bargaining ammunition with
shipowners").
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number of attacks. 20
Finally, as effectiveness increases with
forcefulness, coastal nations will want to be part of the successful
effort (C).
Too
However, the graphs also portray the tipping points.
aggressive an anti-piracy effort, both militarily and investigatory, will
begin to attract greater terrorist activity, which is devastatingly
Increasing the level of
expensive and tremendously dangerous.
aggressiveness too much also risks losing coalition members.
Thus, optimal deterrence is a comprehensive legal and strategic
theory for anti-piracy specifically and for naval constabulary
It reveals international law as sufficiently
operations in general.
enabling; defines the status of detained pirates; proposes domestic
legal and operational reforms; and advances a military posture, both
sufficiently pronounced as well as sufficiently restrained.

II.

ENEMIES OF ALL MANKIND: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND THE
BASIC DEFINITION OF PIRACY

On January 20, 2006, the merchant vessel Delta Ranger came
under attack by ten Somali men armed with AK-47s and RPG
launchers. 21 The Somalis approached at high rates of speed in small
skiffs, approximately 210 nautical miles off the Somali coast. 22
Through defensive maneuvers and rudder swings, Delta Ranger was
23
able to escape the attack, but it sustained bullet holes in its hull.
By the time the Navy could respond the next day, it found two skiffs
attached to one Indian dhow, the Safina al Bisarat,with the ten men
holding captive sixteen Indian crewmembers. 2 4 Was this piracy?

20.
2005 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
21.
See U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1630, at 29, U.N. Doc S/2006/229 (2005),
available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S2006229.pdf.
22.
See id. (placing the hijacking "about 300 kilometers off the Somali coast").
23.
See id.
In this instance, the name of the [attacked] vessel [was] known: the Bahamasregistered bulk carrier MVDelta Ranger. Little did the pirates know that this
attack would trigger a chain of events that would make it their last. The MV
Delta Ranger reported the attack to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
at Kuala Lumpur. The hunters had now become the hunted.
Id.
24.
See US Navy capture pirates, SHIPTALK.COM, Jan. 22, 2006, http://www.
shiptalk.comindex.asp?ItemID=249&rcid=149&pcid=148&cid=149 ("The Navy says
sailors discovered 16 Indians and 10 Somalis aboard the vessel (a dhow), along with
various small arms.").
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Yes, it was piracy, both against the Delta Ranger and the Safina
al Bisarat.According to Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) 25 and Article 15 of the Geneva Convention on
the High Seas (High Seas Convention), 26 piracy consists of any of the
following acts:
(a)

any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i)

on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b)

any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft;

(c)

any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
27
in subparagraph (a) or (b).

The United States is not a party to UNCLOS, but it is a party to
the 1958 High Seas Convention. Regardless, the definition of piracy
contained within both these treaties has become customary
international law, binding on all nations, including the United
28
States.
The Somali men in the first instance committed an act of illegal
violence against Delta Ranger, on the high seas, against another ship,
for private ends. The same Somalis were pirates for hijacking the
Indian dhow. In fact, on January 16, 2006, these same ten men
allegedly chased down Safina Al Bisarat in their skiffs, fired AK-47s
in the air, aimed RPG launchers, and eventually boarded the hapless

25.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
26.
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention].
27.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 101; High Seas Convention, supra note 26,
at art. 15.
28.
Customary international law is comprised of those practices and customs
that states view as obligatory and that are engaged in or otherwise acceded to by a
preponderance of states in a uniform and consistent fashion. See IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-7 (Oxford Press 1998) (1966); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)

(1987) (stating that customary international law "results from . . . [the] consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation"). According to the
Restatement, "by express or tacit agreement accompanied by consistent practice, the
United States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive provisions of the
Convention, other than those addressing deep sea-bed mining, as statements of
customary law binding upon them apart from the Convention." Id. Pt. V, introductory
note.
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dhow in the hopes of using it as a "mother ship" from which to commit
29
other attacks, one of which against the Delta Ranger.
Just because their armed attack, on the high seas, from a second
vessel, and for private ends qualifies the ten Somalis as pirates iure
gentium, how can the international community that promulgated this
definition hold the men themselves accountable? In other words,
with international law applying among states, and with pirates being
non-state actors by definition, how can "pirates" be convicted of the
crime of piracy?
The answer lies in universal jurisdiction. Under international
law, any person who fits the international definition of a pirate can be
30
prosecuted by any state, based on that state's own anti-piracy laws.
Piracy, in fact, is the oldest offense that invokes this powerful
31
jurisdictional brand, dating back as far as the sixteenth century.
Even before there was such a thing as "international law" in the
modern sense, pirates were considered hostis humani generienemies of all mankind. 32 The English Act of Henry VIII of 1516
extended the jurisdiction of the Crown to pirates. 33 In 1615, British
courts determined "pirataest hostis humani generic. '34 In 1822, a
U.S. federal judge wrote that, "[N]o one can doubt that vessels and
property in the possession of pirates may be lawfully seized on the
'35
high seas by any persons, and brought in for adjudication.

29.

See U.N. Sec. Council, supra note 21, at 29.

30.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987).

31.
See Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33
CAL. L. REV. 177, 181-94 (1945); cf. Edwin D. Dickinson, Is The Crime of Piracy
Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335-39 (1925) (dating pirates as the enemies of all
mankind subject to universal jurisdiction to at least as early as the seventeenth
century); see also Zou Keyuan, Implementing the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Trends, 9 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37, 44
(2005) (explaining that piracy existed in the East Asian region as early as the
fourteenth century). During Zheng He's seven voyages to the Indian Ocean during the
Ming Dynasty (1405-1433 A.D.), he undertook action to suppress pirates in the South
China Sea and Southeast Asia to bring order and maintain a degree of peace in the
region.
32.
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdictionunder International Law, 66
TEX. L. REV. 785, 791 (1988).
33.
An Act for the punishment of pirates and robbers of the sea, 1516, 39 Hen.
8, c. 15 (Eng.); In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586, 837 (P.C.) (U.K.).
34.
King v. Marsh, (1615) 81 Eng. Rep. 23 (K.B.).
35.
United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551); see also United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232
(1844) ("A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani generic."); United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 156 (1820) ("The common law, too, recognizes
and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its own municipal code, but as an offence
against the law of nations (which is part of the common law), as an offence against the
universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race."); 2 JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 951-68 (1906).
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In the mid-nineteenth century, the modern movement toward
formalizing piracy's ignominious status in treaties began. 36 During
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nations37 actually used
The letter of
pirates to harass their enemies' merchant shipping.
marque, issued to such historical luminaries as Francis Drake and
38
Walter Raleigh, was an official commission to engage in piracy.
After a series of draconian laws passed by George I of England
effectively banished pirates from the Atlantic, the famed
Mediterranean corsairs became the "maritime mercenaries" of
choice. 39 Once the wars ended, however, the corsairs continued their
piratical ways 4 0-much to the chagrin of the European nations. With
trade flourishing in the relative calm of Napoleon's demise and
Metternich's Concert, nations no doubt began to increasingly view
piracy as detrimental to their commercial and imperial interests.
Therefore, to counter a menace that attacked all nations
indiscriminately and that could not be controlled by the normal
means of state-on-state diplomacy or warfare, 41 they signed the
Declaration of Paris in 1856.42 At the same time the major powers

36.
Prior to the modern era, perhaps the earliest multilateral efforts against
piracy were those undertaken by the cities of the Hanseatic League from the thirteenth
century onward. At its beginning, the Hanseatic League united German cities because
defense at sea was necessary against the swarms of pirates in the Baltic, North Sea,
and elsewhere. See Samuel J. Menefee, The New "JamaicaDiscipline . Problems with
Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 127, 133 (1990).
37.
Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden, LEGAL AFF., JulyAug. 2005, at 32, 34 ("Queen Elizabeth viewed English pirates as adjuncts to the royal
navy, and regularly granted them 'letters of marque' (later known as privateering, or
piracy, commissions) to harass Spanish trade.").
38.
Id. Burgess further explains that while issuing these letters of marque, the
queen of England, for example, could preserve the vestiges of diplomatic relations,
reacting with feigned horror to revelations of the pirates' depredations:
Witness, for example, the queen's disingenuous instructions saying that if
Raleigh "shall at any time or times hereafter robbe or spoile by sea or by lance,
or do any acte of unjust or unlawful hostilities [he shall] make full restitution,
and satisfaction of all such injuries done." When Raleigh did what Elizabeth
had forbidden-namely, sack and pillage the ports of then-ally SpainElizabeth knighted him.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
See id. ('The corsairs refused to curtail their activities after each war's
conclusion, and the states realized that they had created an uncontrollable force.").
41.
Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro,
Piracy and the IMO Convention of Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 287-88
(1988).
42.
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, available at
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/INTRO/105?OpenDocument.
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were concluding the Crimean War, they abolished state-sponsored
43
piracy.
Until recently, however, universal jurisdiction over piracy was
largely thought to be a historical artifact with little or no modern
relevance. The NASSAU Strike Group has proven that assumption
itself to be outdated. Today, Article 105 of UNCLOS, which is
identical to Article 19 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, provides:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or
aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the
persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which
carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed,
and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ship,
aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good
44
faith.

This provision indicates that parties have the right, but not the
obligation, to assume jurisdiction over piratical acts with which they
have no direct connection. 4 5 Nonparties to the Convention may
assert universal jurisdiction over piracy under customary
international law. 46 The state that flagged the pirate vessel will
retain jurisdiction, if the vessel is indeed flagged-unlike the skiffs
used by the Somali pirates 47-but under universal jurisdiction it will

43.
In 1861, at the beginning of the Civil War, the United States, while not a
signatory to the Declaration, announced that it would nevertheless respect the
principles of the Declaration for the duration of the hostilities. See id. Additionally, in
1898 during the war against Spain, it was affirmed that the policy of the government of
the United States would be to abide by the provisions of the Declaration throughout
the hostilities. The rules laid down in the Declaration were later considered part of
general international law, and even the United States, which is not formally a party
thereto, abides by its provisions. Id.; see also Menefee, supra note 36, at 133; Ruth
Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of JonathanRobbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 239
n.26 (1990).
44.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 105; High Seas Convention, supra note 26,
at art. 19.
45.
Randall, supra note 32, at 792.
46.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 404, 423 (1987) (identifying piracy as one of the offences that the
universality principle permits the United States and other states to define and
adjudicate).
47.
Even if the pirate skiff, or any pirate vessel, flies an actual state's flag, it
can nevertheless be considered a vessel over which no national authority reigns if the
flag state deems as such. See UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 104 ("A ship or aircraft
may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The
retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the state from which such
nationality was derived."). Flying false colors renders the same result. See United
States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
114 (1983). Thus, the pirates lose the protection of legitimate state affiliation and, in
turn, the flag state loses only its ability to claim exclusive jurisdiction. See Harvard
Research in Int'l Law, Draft Convention and Comment on Piracy, 26 AM J. INT'L L. 739,
760-64, 825 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
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simply lose its exclusive jurisdiction normally permitted to its own
vessels and nationals under the law of the sea.
In the United States, for example, Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution provides that: "The Congress shall have Power . . . to

define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offences against the Law of Nations." Congress has exercised
this power by enacting Title 18 U.S. Code Section 1651 which
provides that: "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought
'48
into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life."
In Kenya, where the ten Somalis were tried, Section 69 of the
Kenyan penal code similarly cites the law of nations in its piracy
statute: "Any person who, in territorial waters or upon the high seas,
commits any act of piracy jure gentium is guilty of the offence of
piracy." 49 The High Court of Malaysia has jurisdiction to try all
offences committed within its local jurisdiction, on the high seas on
board any Malaysian-flagged vessel, by any Malaysian citizen or
resident on the high seas, and "by any person on the high seas where
50
the offence is piracy by the law of nations."
But why exactly was universal jurisdiction required?
Bart
Simpson's understanding of the "high seas" as a lawless wild west,
while humorous, reflects a popular misconception.
Universal
jurisdiction does not fill any actual jurisdictional gaps. The high seas,
absent universal jurisdiction, would not be a proverbial no-man's
land, a safe haven for miscreants. After all, pirates do not commit

48.
18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988); see also §§ 1652-1653, 1654-1661 (Piracy and
Privateering); §§ 381-384 (Regulations for the Suppression of Piracy). While U.S. law
makes criminal those acts proscribed by international law as piracy, other provisions of
U.S. municipal law proscribe related conduct. For example, U.S. law makes criminal
arming or serving on privateers, § 1654, and assault by a seaman on a captain so as to
prevent him from defending his ship or cargo, § 1655. Although international law is
law of the United States, a person cannot be tried in the federal courts for an
international crime unless Congress adopts a statute to define and punish the offense.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 111,
422 cmt. a (1987); see also United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816)
(finding no federal common law crimes in United States); United States v. Hudson, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). The act of Congress may, however, define the offense by
reference to international law. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946); Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 156
(1820). The language of 18 USC § 1651 (1948) (Piracy Under the Law of Nations)
might suggest that the United States would have to wait until a pirate is in the United
States before taking any action against him. However, in United States v. Yunis, 924
F.2d 1086, 1091-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the court determined that it had jurisdiction over
a defendant accused of aircraft piracy under a statute with a similar jurisdictional
provision, even though the only reason he was in the United States was because he had
been forcibly taken there.
49.
Penal Code of Kenya (1967) Cap. 8 § 69(1), 24 s. 6.
50.
Courts of Judicature Act § 22(1)(a)(iv) (1964) (Malaysia).
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their acts in the water, but on, and against, other ships. Vessels on
the seas have always been considered within the territorial
jurisdiction of their flag state, and that state retains jurisdiction over
the pirates that attacked its ship. 51 Moreover, both the pirates and
crime could have
their victims have come from somewhere; thus, the
52
states.
home
their
of
jurisdiction
the
within
been
of
Universal jurisdiction actually solves the problem
enforcement. Ruth Wedgwood explains that relying on nationality for
jurisdiction was problematic because nationality was not always
clear: "[T]he basis for ascribing human nationality may be birthplace,
genealogical descent, prior oath-taking, or current profession of
allegiance."5 3 Additionally, ships can change (and feign) nationality
by conveyance of title or by hoisted flag, complicating any claim of
exclusive jurisdiction. 54 Concurrent jurisdiction had the "considerable
virtue of permitting any nation catching an offender to act upon his
wrongs-without resolving the fine points of a theory of exclusive
jurisdiction, and without facing the political, moral, and legal
concerns of aiding a foreign system of justice. '55 In sum, as Professor
Anne-Marie Slaughter explains, universal jurisdiction is the "way in
which international law has responded to the pragmatic

See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 18-19 (Sept.
51.
7) [hereinafter S.S. Lotus]; see also Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. AlvarezMachain: What Piracy Reveals about the Limits of the Alien-Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 111, 151 (2004).
See S.S. Lotus, supra note 51, at 18 (finding that "the courts of many
52.
countries, even of countries which have given their criminal legislation a strictly
territorial character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offenses, the authors of
which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are
nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one
of the constituent elements of the offense, and more especially its effects, have taken
place there"). In general, customary international law recognizes four bases on which a
state may exercise criminal jurisdiction over a citizen or non-citizen for acts committed
outside of the prosecuting state, in addition to universal jurisdiction. These four wellrecognized bases of criminal jurisdiction are: (1) the "objective territorial principle,"
which provides for jurisdiction over conduct committed outside a state's borders that
has, or is intended to have, a substantial effect within its territory; (2) the "nationality
principle," which provides for jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts committed by a
state's own citizen; (3) the "protective principle," which provides for jurisdiction over
acts committed outside the state that harm the state's interests; and (4) the "passive
personality principle," which provides for jurisdiction over acts that harm a state's
citizens abroad. See generally Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 666 (2d
Cir. 1983) (citing Introductory Comment to Research on International Law, Part II,
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445
(Supp. 1935)); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380-83 & nn.13-16
(11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8,10-11 (2d Cir. 1968).
53.
Wedgwood, supra note 43, at 239.
54.
Id.
Id.
55.
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difficulties ...
of prosecuting offences recognized as illegal in
'56
domestic legal systems around the world.
It is upon this impetus behind universal jurisdiction that the
United States, and other nations, must capitalize. The status of
pirates as subject to universal jurisdiction will remain secure, at least
for the foreseeable future. If trade and imperial ambitions initially
motivated the Europeans to ban state-sponsored privateering (and
thereby all forms of piracy), the fact that approximately 90% of
57
current world trade is conducted through maritime channels will
likely mean that states (especially maritime states) will have very
little incentive to revoke pirates' status as global outlaws.
Additionally, with 50,000 vessels transiting the multi-nation Straits
of Malacca each year, 58 the pragmatic need for universal enforcement
seems just as certain.
While these facts emphasize the need and benefit of
regional/coalition security arrangements, to be discussed in depth
below, they also reveal a caveat. States, concerned with countering a
common threat, are also wary lest any common actions infringe on
their sovereignty. 59 Any regional/coalition security arrangements, or
any proposed changes to the law of piracy, which would threaten
territorial sovereignty are likely to fail.
Universal jurisdiction
authorized a common pursuit and prosecution, but only outside the
jurisdiction of any state-a fact to be further analyzed in the next
Part.

III. THE THREE PERCEIVED "GAPS" IN THE BASIC DEFINITION
The key to effective anti-piracy operations, as well as counter
maritime terrorism, is availing the United States and coalition
members of universal jurisdiction.
Meeting the international
definition of piracy affords the United States and its partners the first
crack at prosecuting those now detained in their brigs, or just as
important, affords them the largest set of available countries to which
to turn over those they capture. After a one-week investigation into
the ten Somali pirates from the Safina, the United States decided not

56.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and
National Courts, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION

OF SERIOUS

CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

Macedo ed., 2004).
57.
International Maritime
Organization,
http://www.imo.org/about/mainframe.asp?topic-id=3.
58.

2005 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 4, at 32.

59.

Halberstam, supra note 41, at 287-88.
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to prosecute and found a willing partner in Kenya. 60 For the March
incident, which involved the death of one Somali, we found it
impossible to find any nation willing to prosecute. The difference
between the two is that in the former, the elements of piracy were
sufficiently met to afford universal jurisdiction, while in the latter,
there was not enough evidence to meet the elements of UNCLOS
Article 101.
Thus, it is essential to fully understand Article 101. While there
may be at least six different meanings of "piracy" circulating among
various domestic and international laws, 61 the UNCLOS definition is
the binding "black letter law" applicable to all nations. 62 It is the
starting point for any discussion on how nations, as opposed to
statistical agencies or insurance companies, should respond to the
resurgence of piracy.
The Safina incident was straightforward-there was an armed
attack, on the high seas, for private ends, by another ship-but other
situations will not always be that easy. What if the attack occurred
within a nation's territorial seas? What if the suspected pirates were
"freedom fighters"? What if the suspected pirates had posed as
legitimate crewmembers rather than attacking from skiffs? These
questions will illustrate the three purported "gaps" in the UNCLOS
definition: (1) its limitation of piracy to the high seas; (2) its "for
private ends" provision; and (3) its two-ship requirement. Only the
first, however, will prove a true gap. Despite the hopes of many
theorists, closing that gap through international legal reform will
prove improbable, as well as inadvisable.
As for the latter two, neither will prove a gap at all. Despite
conventional wisdom to the contrary, freedom fighters or political
terrorists can be pirates, and no second ship is necessarily required
for piracy.
In essence, piracy analysis turns on the relationship among the
act, actors, and states. If the piratical act occurs within a state's
jurisdiction, or if the pirates (or their specific acts) are commissioned
by a state, then the act is not piracy. The harmed states can seek
redress to deter future attacks through diplomatic and military
channels. If, on the other hand, the act has no state connection, then
the only means of redress is through criminal or constabulary means.

60.
U.S. Embassy, Pub. Affairs Section, Capture of Suspected Somali Pirates
(Feb. 2, 2006), http://usembassy.state.gov/nairobi/wwwhsusopir.html.

See Lawrence J. Kahn, Pirates,Rovers, and Thieves: New Problems with an
61.
Old Enemy, 20 TUL. MAR. L.J. 293, 295-96 (1996).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
62.
STATES pt. V, introductory note (1987) ("Where the Convention reflects customary law,
this Restatement generally uses the language of the Convention as a 'blackletter'
statement of international law.").
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Subjective intent of the attackers does not alone establish the
necessary state connection.
A. Piracy,for which Universal JurisdictionApplies, Cannot Exist in
TerritorialWaters-Nor Should It
Suppose that the armed attack on the Delta Ranger and the
Safina Al Bisarat occurred less than twelve nautical miles from
Somalia. Would that attack still be considered piracy?
No. An armed attack on a ship committed 12.1 nautical miles
out to sea differs from the exact same act 11.9 miles out to sea in that
the former, under internationallaw, is piracy, and the latter is not.
The connection of the act to the state is the determinative factor.
Seaward of twelve nautical miles from a coastal state's "baseline"
are its territorial seas. 63 Territorial seas are subject to the territorial
sovereignty, and thus criminal codes and local courts, of coastal
nations. 64 If the armed act occurs within the territorial seas of a
country, it is a violation of that country's municipal code, just as if a
robbery occurred in one of that nation's cities. Of course, a municipal
code could refer to those acts as piracy, but they would not be piracy
iure gentium, and consequently those acts would not trigger universal
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the right and responsibility for enforcing
domestic law in territorial waters befalls the coastal state, and
personal jurisdiction attaches.
Outside territorial waters, however, there is limited coastal state
jurisdiction and therefore limited enforcement ability.6 5 International
waters are those in which all nations enjoy high seas freedoms of
navigation and over-flight. 66 No nation, with limited exceptions for

63.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 2. The United States claims a twelve
nautical mile territorial sea and recognizes territorial sea claims of other nations up to
a maximum breadth of twelve nautical miles. See President's Statement on the Law of
the Sea (Mar. 10, 1983), available at www.un.org[Depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND
TREATIES/PDFFILES/USA_1983_Statement.pdf ("[T]he United States will recognize
the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the Convention,
so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and other under international
law are recognized by such coastal states.").
64.
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone arts. 1-2, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention);
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art 2.
65.
As one moves beyond the territorial waters, a coastal state still retains
some jurisdiction and enforcement abilities in what is known as its contiguous zone.
Within that zone, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent or
punish infringement of its navigation, sanitation, customs, and fiscal and immigration
laws and regulations. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 3.3. Violent crimes, however, are
not part of the jurisdictional reach of the contiguous zone. Id.
66.
RICHARD J. GRUNAWALT, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
1.5 (1997) [hereinafter COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS].
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exclusive economic zones (EEZ), may exercise its jurisdiction over the
high seas. 67 Thus, if an armed attack occurs on a vessel within a
nation's territorial waters, it will be up to the coastal state to repress
68
and prosecute that act under its domestic law.
There is no problem with such a setup so long as the coastal
state: (a) has a municipal law proscribing such attacks; (b) is willing
to enforce it; and (c) is physically able to do so.
Think, however, about Somalia. Since 1991, that nation has had
no functioning government, no real laws, and no enforcement
power. 69 When asked why he and his compatriots were caught with
weapons, one of the ten suspected Somali pirates simply responded to
me, "I am Somali; the gun is our government." Pottengal Mukundan,
Director of the IMB, stated that the absence of an effective
government in Somalia amounted to a "pirates' charter."70 Lacking
71
such a government, Somalia has no formal maritime defense forces,
and thus it ranked second highest in the world for reported piracy
attacks. In 2005, it was considered the most dangerous nation in

67.
UNCLOS piracy provisions do apply to the EEZ. See UNCLOS, supra note
25, at art. 58(2) (noting high seas provisions apply to EEZ unless displaced). After all,
pursuing pirates does not impinge on any economic rights reserved to coastal states.
See, e.g., Thomas A. Clingan Jr., The Law of Piracy, in PIRACY AT SEA 170 (Eric Ellen
ed., 1989).
68.
See generally UNCLOS, supra note 25, at arts. 21, 27.
See U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Somalia, http://www.state.gov/r/
69.
pa/ei/bgn2863.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Background Note: Somalia]
("Somalia has been without a central government since 1991, and much of the territory
has been subject to serious civil strife."). A two-year reconciliation process led by the
Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), however, concluded in 2004.
IGAD resulted in the formation of a transitional government, the components of which
are known as the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). The TFIs include a
transitional parliament, known as the Transitional Federal Assembly (formed in
August 2004), as well as a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that includes a
transitional President, Prime Minister, and ninety member cabinet known as the
"Council of Ministers." The TFIs, however, have only just begun to establish authority
inside Somalia. On February 26, 2006 the first session on Somali soil of the
Transitional Federal Parliament took place in the city of Baidoa. Guled Mohamed,
Somali Parliament Holds First Session on Home Soil, Feb. 26, 2006,
http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6943. See generally infra notes 116-19
and accompanying text.
Rob Crilly, African Businesses Hit Hard as Tourists Scared off by Pirates,
70.
USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2005, at A14.
The Somali Transitional
71.
Background Note: Somalia, supra note 69.
Government, however, had reportedly contracted with a U.S. marine security firm to
help control piracy off its waters. See U.S. Firm to Fight Somali Pirates, BBC NEWS,
Nov. 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4471536.stm [hereinafter Fight Somali
Pirates]. Unfortunately, it appears it may have contracted with a defunct company.
Despite the reported $50 million contract, there has been no evidence of patrols or
interceptions made by that firm. See U.S. to Help Tackle Somali Pirates, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4915726.stm [hereinafter Tackle Somali
Pirates]. Had it actually received the maritime security services, it would have been
interesting to note how it would have paid for them.
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Africa. 72 During a two-month stretch in 2005-2006, the NASSAU
Strike Group and the international community observed extended
hostage scenarios. 7 All it could do, however, was monitor the
situation because the hostage-takers were not definitively pirates, at
74
least not for the acts they were then committing.
On the other hand, in the three nations that border the Straits of
Malacca, the 550-mile wide waterway that carries one-third of the
world's trade, half of the world's oil supply, and is the most dangerous
chokepoint on earth for piracy, 75 there are laws and effective
governments with the will to enforce their laws, but the hundreds of
miles of coastline and numerous uninhabited islands make maritime
law enforcement exceedingly difficult. Resource limitation has limited
the effectiveness of the coastal states' efforts to patrol the Straits and
its approaches, through which 600 vessels and 11 million barrels of
oil pass through each day. 76 Indonesia, for example, in whose waters
most of the maritime attacks occur, must sweep the Augean stables of
its vast coastline and 17,000 islands with an aging and depleted navy,
consisting of dilapidated warships, patrol boats, and support vessels,
most of which are not even seaworthy. 77 No doubt the December
2004 tsunami is also hampering Indonesia's efforts to shore up its
78
maritime security.
Because the majority of attacks actually occur in the territorial
seas of nations such as Indonesia, the IMB, citing "statistical
reasons," removed the line of demarcation between UNCLOS piracy,

72.

2005 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.

See, for example, the fishing vessel Feng Jung 16 and merchant vessel
73.
Julia 54, the facts of which are summarized in the 2005 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 4,
at 27.
74.
Of course, an argument can be made that Somalia, a "failed state," has no
territorial waters, and thus those who commit crimes within its coastal waters are
indeed pirates under UNCLOS. See discussion infra Part III.
75.
See Inst. for the Analysis of Global Sec., Chilly Response to U.S. Plan to
Deploy Forces in the Strait of Malacca, May 24, 2003, http://www.iags.org/
n0524042.htm.
Ioannis Gatsiounis, Malacca Strait: Target for Terror, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
76.
Aug. 11, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheastAsia/FHllAeO2.html.
77.
See, e.g., Inst. for the Analysis of Global Sec., supra note 75; Gatsiounis,
supra note 76 (noting "only 30 of the Indonesia navy's 117 warships are currently
operational"). Indonesia, however, has announced plans to augment its fleet by sixty
modern patrol vessels over the next decade. Still, Indonesia's Chief Admiral admits
that his fleet is "almost obsolete." Indonesia Plans Fleet Expansion, ABC NEWS
ONLINE, Feb. 12, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200502/s1301509.htm.
78.
Tammy Sittnick, State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism In The
Strait of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to Take Additional Steps to
Secure the Strait, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 743, 753-54 (2005).
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which must occur on the high seas, and "armed robbery against
ships, '7 9 in its definition of "Piracy and Armed Robbery":
An act of boarding, or attempting to board any ship with the apparent
intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent
0
or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.8

But why only remove the demarcation line for "statistical
purposes"? Why must hostaged crewmembers in Somali territorial
waters be kept from their saviors by an invisible fence-line .1 miles
away?
The answer: "Nebraska."

If, for example, a man demands money from another by gunpoint
in a dark Nebraska alleyway, France does not send in its military.
Indeed, even if the French offered, the United States would never

allow foreign militaries to patrol its streets.
territorial waters.
law applies, and

The same applies to

Within the twelve nautical miles, coastal nation
it is that coastal nation's coast guard, or its

equivalent, that has the responsibility for policing its borders.8 1 The
principle of universal jurisdiction does not allow nations to violate the
sovereignty of other nations to seek out the accused (though if such

"kidnapping" occurs, jurisdiction in the new state is still valid).8 2 In
fact, UNCLOS only provides a right of innocent passage through a
nation's territorial

seas, passage which expressly does not include

"any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State," or even "any
exercise or practice with weapons of any kind. '8 3 In other words, few

The IMB defines armed robbery against ships as: "any unlawful act of
79.
violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of
'piracy,' directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship,
within a State's jurisdiction over such offences." Robert C. Beckman, Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Southeast Asia: The Way Forward, 33
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 317, 319 (2002).
80.
2005 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
81.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at arts. 21, 27.
82.
The classic case is of Adolf Eichmann. The head of the Jewish Gestapo did
not have any claim based on Israel's admitted violation of Argentina's territorial
sovereignty; only Argentina could assert that international law violation. As indicated
in the district court's opinion in Eichmann, "the violation by one country of the
sovereignty of another is susceptible of redress as between the two countries and
cannot vest in the accused rights of his own." Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36
I.L.R. 18, 70 (D.C. of Jm. 1961), aff'd, [1962] 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. 1962). This decision
is consistent with the United States' Ker-Frisbie doctrine, which holds that
irregularities in the defendant's procurement do not violate due process, assuming that
the defendant receives the necessary procedural guarantees once within the
prosecution's jurisdiction. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1986) (international seizure);
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (domestic interstate seizure), reh'g denied, 343
U.S. 937 (1952); see also United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
83.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 19.
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nations, if any, would appreciate, or tolerate, foreign militaries
policing their maritime Nebraska.
From Malaysia's perspective, threats to its sovereignty are its
highest priority.8 4 Indonesian priorities are similar.8 5 In 2004, the
United States, through Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander Pacific
Fleet, offered Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore direct aid to share
intelligence and maintain joint training exercises. 86 Malaysia's
Defense Minister refused any U.S. warships in its territorial seas,
including its portion of the Straits of Malacca. 87 Indonesia responded
to the offer by stating: "We may need a thousand ships, but not the
Americans .... These are our straits. 8 8 Misleading reports that the
United States wanted to take part in joint patrols in the Straits
evoked irritated responses from Malaysia, as well as Indonesia, which
suggested that the presence of foreign forces would fuel Islamic
fanaticism. 89 In other words, Malaysia and Indonesia are also
worried that having U.S. warships in its territorial seas would
transform mere piracy into piratical terrorism.
Singapore, on the other hand, welcomed U.S. involvement. 90 But
would it welcome Chinese involvement? Would the United States
welcome Iran's patrolling two miles off the coast of New York City? If
the definition of piracy in international law were changed to
obliterate the territorial fence-line, all nations would be entitled to
enter one another's territorial seas. It would not make any sense to
change UNCLOS Article 101 without changing the enforcement
provision in Article 105.

84.
Mark J. Valencia, Ensuring Asia's Maritime Security, FAR E. ECON. R.,
Oct. 14, 2004, at 27. For an excellent analysis of Southeast Asian sovereignty
sensitivities as a whole, see generally John F. Bradford, The Growing Prospects for
Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 2005,
at 63.
85.
See generally ROBERT MANGINDAAN, MARITIME TERRORIST THREAT: AN
INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE, a paper prepared for the "Workshop on Maritime CounterTerrorism," Nov. 29-30, 2004, New Delhi, India, available at www.observerindia.com/
reports/maritime/paper indn.pdf. Rear Admiral (Ret) Mangindaan, a member of the
Board of Experts to the Governor of Indonesian National Resilience Institute,
concluded his paper with, "It was quite clear that the position of Indonesia to be selfreliant and the government will not use nor 'borrow' the external forces to fight
maritime terrorism within our national jurisdiction." Id. at 6.
86.
Benjamin Sand, US, Malaysia to Boost Security in Asian Shipping, VOICE
OF AM., June 21, 2004, available at http://www.iwar.org.uklnews-archive/2004/06-214.htm. The Regional Maritime Security Initiative, which Admiral Fargo formally
proposed, will be discussed in greater detail infra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
87.
Strait Talks on Oil Tanker Terror Fear, HERALD SUN (AUSTRALIA), June 4,
2004.
88.
Id.
89.
P.T. Bangsberg, Malaysia Rejects US Patrols for Malacca Strait, PACIFIC
SHIPPER, June 9, 2004.
90.
Yeoh En-Lai, Terror Fears Grow on Vital Oil Route, Muslim Nations
Dismiss U.S. Help for Straits of Malacca, GRAND FORKS HERALD, June 4, 2004.
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The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention or Rome
Convention), drafted in response to the Achille Lauro affair, 91
effectively changed the long-standing definition of piracy to include
attacks within territorial waters. 92 However, it did not extend
universal jurisdiction to such attacks. Most significantly, it did not
extend universal, or even U.S., enforcement where it is needed the
most.
Under the Convention, State Parties bind themselves to consider
as offences those acts that are "unlawfully and intentionally"
committed by a person who:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or
any other form of intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that
act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by means whatsoever, a
device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause
damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or it is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or
seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows that is false, thereby
endangering the safe navigation of the ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the
attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs
(a) to (f).93

It is worth pointing out that not only are territorial limitations
stripped away from the above definitions (under which piracy and

91.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988)
[hereinafter SUA Convention]. The other instrument is the 1988 Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol), 27 I.L.M. 685 (1988), which was adopted at the same
time as the Rome Convention and contains similar provisions.
92.
See generally Tullio Treves, The Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
541 (1998). Treves is the judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
93.
SUA Convention, supra note 91, at art. 3.1. Attempting or abetting the
commission of these offences, or being otherwise an accomplice, are also offences under
the Convention, as is the act of a person who threatens to commit the offences set forth
in paragraphs (b), (c), and (e) "with or without a condition, as provided for under
national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical person to do or refrain from
doing any act," provided the threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship
in question. Id. at art. 3.2.
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piratical terrorism are subsumed), but the "for private ends" language
and any reference to two vessels are noticeably absent as well.
Additionally, the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention, not yet
entered into force, outlaws acts designed to "intimidate a population,
or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or
to abstain from any act" when those acts involve a weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) (be it radiological, chemical, or biological) or the
'94
use of a vessel in a manner that "causes death or serious injury.
The 2005 Amendment also proscribes unlawful WMD proliferation. 95
But defining a crime only goes so far. Jurisdiction is required, as is
the means to enforce the law.
The SUA Convention does not extend universal jurisdiction over
the above offences, but it does create a broad jurisdictional grant,
providing it over any ship that "is navigating or is scheduled to
navigate into, through or from the waters beyond the outer limit of
the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its
territorial sea with adjacent States." 96 As specified in the travaux,
the SUA Convention will thus logically apply in "straits used for
international navigation. ' 97 In the unlikely event that jurisdiction
does not attach in the first circumstance, the Convention also
provides jurisdiction "when the offender or the alleged offender is
found in the territory of a State party other than the State referred to
'
in paragraph 1." 98
But, despite the SUA Convention's title, the means for actual
suppression
of pirates
or piratical terrorists, jurisdiction
notwithstanding, are scant. The Convention only obligates party
states to establish jurisdiction where possible, submit those cases
falling within their jurisdictions to their competent authorities for
prosecution, 99 or extradite the alleged offender to another competent

Amendments to the 1988 SUA Convention and its related Protocol were
94.
adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties held
October 10-14, 2005. The amendments were adopted in the form of Protocols to the
SUA treaties (the 2005 Protocols). The amendments will enter into force ninety days
after the date on which twelve states have either signed it without reservation as to
ratification, acceptance, or approval, or have deposited an instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession with the Secretary-General. The amended Protocol
requires ratification from three states that are also party to the SUA Convention, but it
cannot come into force unless the 2005 SUA Convention is already in force.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at art. 4.1.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at art. 4.2.
99.

Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 3 in cases
where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite him to any of the State parties which have established their
jurisdiction in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

20071

ATTAINING OPTIMAL DETERRENCE AT SEA

state. 100 While ratification of the Convention gives signatory
governments the power to prosecute people caught in their own
territorial waters for acts of SUA-defined piracy committed in
another country's jurisdiction, 101 there is no right-of-entry into
territorial waters for nations capable of actual suppression. There is
also no real obligation to submit offenders to criminal jurisdiction and
consequently to punish them. 102 A state party does have the
obligation, if it does not extradite, to "submit the case without delay
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the law of that State"'10 3 and to "take
[its] decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of
a grave nature under the law of that State";1 0 4 but it is not required
to actually prosecute the alleged offender before an independent court
of criminal justice.10 5
Article 13 only requires states to cooperate in the prevention of
offences by:
(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparation in their
respective territories for the commission of those offences within or
outside their territories;
(b) exchanging information in accordance with their national law, and
coordinating administrative and other measures as appropriate to
prevent the commission of offences set forth in article 3.106

Most significant, however, is that while UNCLOS is customary
international law binding on all nations, the SUA Convention is only
applicable to those states that have signed onto it. 10 7 Only if the

Id. at art. 6.4.
100.
Id. at art. 10.1.
The State Party in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is
found shall, in cases to which article 6 applies, if it does not extradite him, be
obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was
committed in its territory, to submit the case without delay to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance
with the law of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the
same manner as in the case of any other offence of grave nature under the law
of that State.
101.
Id.
102.
See generally Treves, supra note 92.
103.
SUA Convention, supranote 91, at art. 11.1.
104.
Id. at art. 10.1.
105.
Treves, supra note 92, at 550. It is just required to hold a preliminary
hearing. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
106.
SUA Convention, supranote 91, at art. 13.1.
107.
See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND How WE USE IT 64 (1994) (stating that jurisdiction created by treaty is never
"universal jurisdiction stricto sensu" because only state parties are vested with
jurisdiction by the treaty). Thus, SUA would only oblige contracting states to enact
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perpetrators or victims are nationals of a party state, and only if the
offending acts take place in a party state's territorial waters, or the
offending vessel was scheduled to navigate through such waters, can
the Convention apply.' 0 8 But the SUA Convention is inapplicable to
Somalia as well as to the Straits of Malacca. While Singapore has
ratified the SUA Convention, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Somalia have
not. 10 9 Even party states that are technically obligated to act in
response to an offense are not forced to comply by any sanctions
provisions within the SUA Convention. 110
International law remains grounded in theoretical realism, and
thus one's response must be realistic. The SUA Convention is a step
in the right direction and will likely prove helpful in the broader
context of MSOs, especially with respect to anti-proliferation efforts.
However, since the prospects of changing the enforcement provisions
of customary international law-and in important instances treaty
law as well-to accommodate territorial patrols and incursions are
understandably and justifiably dim, practical means of combating
piracy and piratical terrorism within existing law are essential.
While invitation, U.N. Security Council Resolutions, the addition of
piracy to the Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court could
afford the appropriate jurisdiction and right of entry, changes in
domestic laws and practice will more reliably, and ex ante, optimize
the legal environment for effective counter-piracy efforts, as will be
discussed infra.
B. Terrorism on the High Seas Can Equal Piracy Under International
Law
Now consider what would happen if the attack on the Safina al
Bisarat, while taking place in international waters, had been
motivated by a desire to punish the West for perceived injustices
against Mohammed, or if Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a militant Islamist
group active in several Southeast Asian countries, especially

domestic (or "municipal') laws to proscribe certain conduct or to conform with the
provisions therein.
108.
SUA Convention, supra note 91.
109.
For
signatories,
see
http://www.imo.org/includesfblastDataOnly.asp/
data id%3D13491/status.xls (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). As of October 31, 2006, 142
nations have ratified the 1988 Convention, and 132 have ratified the SUA Protocol.
See IMO, Summary of Conventions as at 30 November 2006, http://www.imo.org/
Conventions/mainframe.asp?topicjid=247.
110.
See SUA Convention, supra note 91, at art. 16 (providing a forum for
dispute resolution between parties regarding issues arising out of the interpretation or
application of the Convention, but providing no specific sanctions).
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Indonesia, 1 1 hijacked an oil tanker in the Straits, threatening to
blow it up if certain demands were not met.
Piracy? Yes. Unless those terrorists were commissioned by a
state, they are private actors. Their armed attack in international
waters, no matter their subjective motivations, would render them
pirates.
Many today, however, mistakenly assume that the "for private
ends" provision within UNCLOS removes terrorist acts from
piracy. 112 Even the Annotated Supplement to the Commander's
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations states that terrorist
attacks on shipping "for the sole purpose of achieving some political
113
end are arguably not piracy under current international law."
Thus, when members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF),
disguised as tourists, boarded the Achille Lauro and threatened to
blow up the cruise ship if Israel did not release fifty Palestinian
prisoners, some argued that their political motivation immunized the
terrorists from being considered pirates. 114 When those same
terrorists shot and killed Leon Klinghoffer, a wheel-chair bound Jew
from the United States, and threw his body into the water, people

111.
Founded in the 1960s by Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, JI's
stated goal is to create an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
and the southern Philippines. Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder: Jemaah
Islamiyah, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8948/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
112.
See, e.g., Keyuan, supra note 31, at 44. Keyuan, while composing an
otherwise trenchant article, merely states that since UNCLOS defines piracy as only
for "private ends," "terrorist acts at sea for political ends are generally excluded." Id.
In Sittnick, supra note 78, at 758, the author writes an otherwise strong piece, but
merely takes as a given that UNCLOS "prevents maritime terrorism from being
included within the ambit of international piracy laws because acts of terrorism are
committed for public political ends." See also Erik Barrios, Casting a Wider Net:
Addressing the Maritime Piracy Problem in Southeast Asia, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 149, 156 (stating that since UNCLOS "excludes attacks that are politically
motivated," maritime crimes "committed by regional dissidents, including kidnappings
of crewmen to put pressure on regional governments and environmental attacks
involving hijacked oil tankers, are not punishable as piracy under UNCLOS"); Randall,
supra note 32, at 798 ("Although universal jurisdiction may exist over the offenders for
crimes other than piracy, universal jurisdiction specifically over piracy will not reach
today's politically motivated actors on the high seas.").
113.

66,

COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note

3.5.2.3 n.30.
114.
See, e.g., George R. Constantinople, Note, Towards a New Definition of
Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 723, 748 (1986) ("The
Palestinians' actions, however, do not qualify as piracy under international law."). It is
worth pointing out that it is not clear whether the initial seizure took place within
Egyptian territorial waters or on the high seas. Regardless, the Achille Lauro was on
the high seas during the hostage phase. Compare John Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400
Seized, Hijackers Demand Release of 50 Palestiniansin Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1985,
at Al, with Perspectives on the Achille Lauro; Jerusalem: Elation at Enemy's Setback,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1985, at 22. Additionally, there was not a second vessel involved
in the attack, a subject that will be address in the next Part.
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still argued that the hijackers were not pirates."15 But, they are
pirates because, like all hostis humani generi, they have no legitimate
connection to a state whereby the international community can seek
redress in the normal diplomatic and military channels. The United
States recognized this age-old distinction and appropriately took the
position that the Achille Lauro terrorists were pirates subject to
universal condemnation and jurisdiction. 116 In fact, all so-called
politically motivated attacks on the high seas are piracies.
The piratization of terrorism is a significant worry in Southeast
Asia 1 7 and is becoming more of a possibility in Somalia. According
to the Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, Osama bin Laden
"is strongly involved in some areas in Somalia and has militant
training bases." 118 Until very recently, Mogadishu was in the hands
of Islamists, separate from the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG). 19 In mid-January, the TFG reasserted its authority with the
help of Ethiopian forces, but militant factions-including possible Al
120
Qaeda suspects-remain.

115.
Constantinople, supra note 114, at 748.
116.
The Justice Department obtained arrest warrants charging the hijackers
with hostage taking, conspiracy, and "piracy on the high seas." Documents Concerning
the Achille Lauro Affair and Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, 24
I.L.M. 1509, 1556-57 (1985). The charge read:
From on or about October 7, 1985, to on or about October 10, 1985, in the
Mediterranean Sea, on the high seas, in various locations outside of the United
States, the defendants, HALLAH ABDALLA AL-ASAN, MAGED YUSSEF ALMALAKI, HAMMAD ALI ABDULLA, ABDEL ATIF IBRAHIM FATAYER, and
ABU EL-ABAS did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully commit and cause the
commission of the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, that is, did
knowingly, willfully and without legal authority from any sovereign power and
for private ends seize control of the cruise ship Achille Lauro by force, violence
and threat of force and violence.
Id.; see also Gerald P. McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications for
International Law, 52 TENN. L. REV. 691, 700 (1985) ("Thus it is evident that the
seizure of the Achille Lauro was piracy jure gentium.").
117.
See generally Rommel C. Banlaoi, Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia:
the Abu Sayyaf Threat, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Autumn 2005, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOJIW/is 4 58/ain15930861; Simon Elegant &
Kuala Sepetang, Dire Straits: Ships that Pass through Some of the Busiest Waterways
in Asia are Often the Target of Pirates.Is a Terrorist Attack Next?, TIME ASIA, Nov. 29,
2004, available at http:Hwww.time.comtime/asia/magazine/article/0, 13673,501041206832306-1,00.html.
118.
Bin Laden Wants More Chaos in Somalia, REUTERS, July 3, 2006, available
at http://www.topix.net/content/reuters/345874998718513121660817804405350355026
0?threadid=VHTI1B7VORPH4CEE.
119.
Jeffrey Gettleman, Islamists Out, Somalia Tries to Rise from the Chaos,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007.
120.
Raid Killed Somali Allies of Al Qaeda, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2007.
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Southeast Asia is home to a multitude of militant organizations,
some of which are violent Islamist groups. 1 2 1 The others have Islam
as an important part of their identity-but only as it relates to
demands for autonomy or secession, not as ends in itself. 12 2 To the
former belong JI and the Mumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia; to the
latter belong the Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front in the Philippines, and the Free Aceh Movement in
Indonesia. 123 Present also in Southeast Asia are radical Islamist
paramilitary groups that "blur the edges between criminal gangs and
militias," like Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Laskar Jihad in
124
Indonesia.
According to Indonesia's state intelligence agency, for example,
detained senior JI members admitted that the group has considered
launching attacks on ships in the Strait of Malacca. 125 In 2002, the
Free Aceh Movement announced that vessels moving through the
Strait were to seek its permission for safe passage. 126 It has also
admitted to attacking Exxon-Mobil natural gas plants in Aceh. 127 In
March 2003, the attack on the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim spread
fears that the attack was "flight school" for maritime 9-11
128
terrorists.
Lamentably, the UNCLOS "for private ends" provision lacks
clarity. Neither the Law of the Sea Convention nor the 1958 High
Seas Convention addresses political activity, nor does either define
"for private ends." Additionally, the document upon which the
drafters of the High Seas Convention heavily relied, the Harvard
Research in International Law and the Comment to the Draft

121.

John Gersham, Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?, FOREIGN AFF., July-

Aug. 2002, at 60.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.; see also Dana R. Dillon, Speech at Nihon University, Mishima, Japan:
Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism (Nov. 19, 2004), transcriptavailable
at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl860.cfm.
125.
Gal Luft & Anne Korin, Terrorism Goes to Sea, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec.
2004, at 63.
126.
Burnett, supra note 11; Elegant & Sepetang, supra note 117.
127.
Burnett, supra note 11.
128.
Id.; see also THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, supra note

14, at 5 (the "capabilities to board and commandeer large underway vesselsdemonstrated in numerous piracy incidents--could also be employed to facilitate
terrorist acts."); Graham Gerard Ong, "Ships Can be Dangerous Too" Coupling Piracy
and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia's Maritime Security Framework, in
INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES WORKING PAPER: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

AND SECURITY ISSUES SERIES 7-8 (2004), available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/
ipsi12004.pdf ("Intelligence analysts believe that because of the hardening of all landbased targets regional terrorist networks will instinctively target the region's maritime
infrastructure, the remaining 'soft belly' of states.").
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(Harvard Research) by Professor Bingham, contains no definition of
129
the phrase.
That said, the history of piracy, the motives behind the
establishment of universal jurisdiction, as well as judicial precedent,
powerfully demonstrate that a thwarted pirate cannot escape the
world's jails merely by pronouncing a political cause, nor must the
international community's diplomatic and military arms stand
impotently by because no state can be fairly held accountable. As
Chief Justice Cockburn noted in In re Tivnan, "it is not because
persons assume the character of belligerents that they can protect
themselves from the consequences of an act really piratical. ''130 "For
private ends" must be understood to distinguish between statesponsored piracy or privateering, which could be redressed under the
laws of war, and piracy, which could not. Again, essential to piracy's
definition is not the actor's intent, but whether any state can be held
liable for the actor's actions.
Recall from Part I that a letter of marque authorized its bearer
to attack and seize civilian ships on the high seas-essentially the
same conduct that constituted piracy. Yet the privateer was not only
free from universal jurisdiction, he was also free of any criminal
culpability. 131 The only difference between a lawful privateer and an
132
outlaw pirate was the latter's lack of sovereign authorization.
Thus, prior to the 1856 Declaration of Paris, someone who committed
the actions constituting piracy, but did so with sovereign
authorization, would not violate the law of nations. 13 But, a pirate
acting without state sanction was considered an enemy of all
mankind.134
Twelve years prior to the Declaration of Paris, Justice Story of
the United States Supreme Court recognized that robbery, or the
intent to benefit financially from a violent act on the high seas, is not
a requisite for piracy:

129.
See Harvard Research, supra note 47.
130.
Samuel J. Menefee, Anti-Piracy Law in the Year of the Ocean, 5 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 312 n.21 (1999).
131.
Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 145-46.
132.
Id. (citing 14 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 251 ("[T]he lord
chancellor shall make him out letters of marque under the great seal; and by virtue of
these he may attack and seise the property ... without hazard of being condemned a
robber or a pirate.")).
133.
Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 145-46.
134.
To further understand why a state would want to lose exclusive jurisdiction
(a necessary corollary to universal jurisdiction), it is important to understand that
historically, pirates were private parties who often acted against the interest of their
home state, and thus were held to waive their home state's protection. See supra note
48. Not only might they attack their home state's ships directly, but by existing sideby-side with privateering, their actions would diminish the state's overall income
derived from privateering as well.
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A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani generis. But
why is he so deemed? Because he commits hostilities upon the subjects
and property of any or all nations, without any regard to right or duty,
or any pretence of public authority. If he willfully sinks or destroys an
innocent merchant ship, without any other object than to gratify his
lawless appetite for mischief, it is just as much a piratical aggression,
in the sense of the law of nations, and of the act of Congress, as if he did
it solely and exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri causa. The law
looks to it as an act of hostility, and being committed by a vessel not
commissioned and engaged in lawful warfare, it treats it as the act of a
135
pirate, and of one who is emphatically hostis humani generis.

Justice Story understood that the very reason piracy became a
universal crime was because attacks at sea by private individuals,
like the corsairs, could not be attributed to any one state. Deciding
the case based on the law of nations, Justice Story defined piracy as
not only "hostile," "wanton," and "criminal in its commission," but
also as "utterly without sanction from any public authority or
sovereign power. '136 In 1819, an appellate court in New York found a
defendant innocent of piracy precisely because there was sanction
from a sovereign power. 137
As the Court proclaimed in Marianna Flora, piracy should be
considered "a private unauthorized war," punishable by "all the
penalties which the law of nations can properly administer." 138
Because attacks without state sanction cannot be addressed within
139
the laws of war and diplomacy, they must be addressed criminally.
Perhaps Viscount Sankey, an authority outside the United
States, puts it best:
When it is sought to be contended, as it was in this case, that armed
men sailing the seas on board a vessel, without any commission from
any state, could attack and kill everybody on board another vessel,
sailing under a national flag, without committing the crime of piracy
unless they stole, say, an article worth six-pence, their Lordships are

135.
Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844) (emphasis
added).
136.
Id.
137.
United States v. Bass, 24 F. Cas. 1028, 1029 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1819) (No. 14,537)
(despite making captures of Spanish and Portuguese vessels, the defendant was found
innocent because he was doing so under the color of authority of the newly independent
provinces of South America).
138.
In re The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 41 (1825).
139.
See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 150 (1820)
(upholding the conviction of a pirate who operated under a commission issued by an
illegitimate and unknown authority (the "Brigadier of the Mexican Republic" and the
"Generalissimo of the Floridas")). The Supreme Court held that since the 'Mexican
Republic" was unknown and unacknowledged by the government of the United States,
and the Floridas were still considered provinces of Spain, the defendant was not
officially authorized to make armed captures at sea, and thus his captures were
properly analyzed as a robbery on the high seas, not "jure belli." Id.
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almost tempted to say that a little common sense is a valuable quality
in the interpretation of international law. 140

It would be nonsensical indeed to interpret "for private ends" in
UNCLOS to exclude the kind of attacks that occurred on the Achille
Lauro or in the hypothetical scenario that appeared at the top of this
Part.
The opposite of "private ends" must be understood as public
ends; that is, ends equating to the commissioned benefit of a state.
The weight of history and precedent for this age-old crime negates
any real ambiguity in the term. 141 United States v. Smith, for
example, cites pages of famed international law publicists who
support this proposition, dating back centuries, including Sir Leoline
Jenkins who wrote: "If these violations of property be perpetrated by
any national authority, they are the commencement of a public war;
if without that sanction, they are acts of pirac." 142 The fact that a
raider may intend to give away his booty like Robin Hood does not
render his actions "for a public end" any more than would a
fundamentalist's hijacking a vessel in the name of his organization,
no matter how political that organization. 143 An eco-warrior who
hobbles an oil tanker may say that he is working for the world public,
but has that public authorized him to do so? No. All three are acting
as individuals, not as states empowered with the ability to declare

140.
In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] App. Cas. 586, 598 (U.K.) (emphasis
added), cited in Halberstam, supra note 41, at 274.
141.
Menefee, supra note 36, at 143 (noting the "ambiguity" in UNCLOS's
failure to define "private ends" or in stating its opposite).
142.
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 163 n.h (1820) (first
emphasis added). The case also states that persons "not under the acknowledged
authority or deriving protection from the flag or commission of any government" are
pirates. Id. at 154; see also United States v. Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1885) (holding that the "majority of authors on international law" define piracy as "the
offense of depredating on the high seas without being authorized by any sovereign
state; or with commissions from different sovereigns at war with each other").
143.
In 1885, the Southern District of New York reasoned:
But if the mayor of New York should send out vessels commissioned in his own
name to blockade Baltimore or Boston, and to capture or sink any British ships
seeking to enter those ports, it would not be contended that the British navy
must remain quiet, and see such vessels sunk, unable to arrest the cruiser as
piratical, because New York city was a politically organized community.
Ambrose Light, 25 F. at 436; see also Smith, 18 U.S. at 163 n.h (quoting Rutherforth:
"A band of robbers or a company of pirates may in fact be united to one another by
compact, &c. But they are still, by the law of nature, only a number of unconnected
individuals; and consequently, in the view of the law of nations they are not considered
as a collective body or public person. For the compact by which they unite themselves
is void, because the matter of it is unlawful, &c. &c. The common benefit which a band
of robbers or a company of pirates propose to themselves consists in doing harm to the
rest of mankind.").
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war. Thus, all three need to be processed in accordance with the
rules of international criminal law, not warfare.
The bottom line is that intent, except to distinguish between
intentional versus accidental attacks, 144 does not matter. Modern
authors like Tina Garmon 145 fall into the trap of looking at the words
divorced from their historical meaning, state practice, and judicial
precedent. 14 6 According to Ms. Garmon: "Current disparities under
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention would enable a situation where a
terrorist organization could hijack a vessel in the high seas with
impunity. Specifically, because terrorists necessarily have a political
goal, their crime is automatically precluded from the consideration of
14 7
piracy."
Even if terrorists "necessarily" had political goals, there are
surely at least some private ends that would bring maritime
terrorists, on the high seas, under UNCLOS. The drafters specifically
excluded the intention to rob (animus furandi) from their definition,
stating in their commentary that acts of piracy "may be prompted by
feelings of hatred or revenge, and not merely by the desire for
gain." 148 Justice Story, after all, noted that piracy is piracy whether
the intent is for "purposes of plunder, or for purposes of hatred,
revenge, or wanton abuse of power. '149 Whether they be payment,
publicity, political advantage within their organization, martyrdom,
revenge, or pure hatred, even political attackers have private aims.
Ms. Garmon provides no support for a proposition that an espoused

144.
According to U.S. case law, a defendant could only be convicted of piracy if
he intended to act as a pirate. See In re The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 6
(1825) (holding that those on a Portuguese vessel that fired upon a U.S. vessel,
mistaking the latter for a pirate vessel on the high seas, could not be convicted of
piracy without showing specific piratical or felonious intent under U.S. law); see also
Ambrose Light, 25 F. at 409 ("It is not necessary that the motive be plunder, or that the
depredations be directed against the vessels of all nations indiscriminately. As in
robbery upon land, it is only essential that the spoliation, or intended spoliation, be
felonious, i.e., done willfully, with intent to injure, and without legal authority or
lawful excuse.").
145.
Tina Garmon, InternationalLaw of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy
and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11"h , 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257 (2002).
146.
See, e.g., In re The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 152, 163-76 (1821)
(finding Defendant, a United States citizen who took out a commission from a nation at
war with Spain to cruise against Spanish shipping guilty of piracy, because at the time,
the United States was in a treaty with Spain forbidding citizens of either side from
taking out such commissions and raiding the commerce of the other; the Defendant,
whose intent may have been political, was nonetheless guilty of piracy because he was
not acting under color of a valid commission).
147.
Garmon, supra note 145, at 274.
148.
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 2
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 253, 282, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 [hereinafter Report of the
InternationalLaw Commission].
149.
Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844).

34

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40.1

political aim automatically negates all other, thoroughly human,
aims. Rather, the Harvard Committee itself specifically keeps the
door open for all manner of motives, be they to "plunder," to act with
"gratuitous malice," or most significant, "to destroy, in private
revenge for real or supposed injuries done by persons or classes of
'150
persons, or by a particular national authority.
Thus, as Malvina Halberstam rightfully concludes, it is indeed
"more likely" that the intention behind the Harvard Committee's
inclusion of the phrase "for private ends" was to "exclude
unrecognized insurgents acting [solely] against a foreign government
and ships acting under public authority" 15 1-precisely what hundreds
of years of history and practice would demand. Erik Barrios concurs
that piracy, throughout history, extended to politically motivated
acts. 152
But strikingly, rather than advocate for a correct
interpretation of the customary international law that UNCLOS
codified, he asserts that UNCLOS represents a "significant departure
from what the international community accepted as piracy." 153 His
only citation is to Malvina Halberstam, who actually argues that
UNCLOS did incorporate the customary international law of piracy,
and that UNCLOS's "for private ends" phrase sought only to exclude
154
from piracy the "unsettled question concerning insurgents."
This discussion leads to the final question under this second
"gap":
what if the supposed pirates are legitimate insurgents,
attacking the shipping of the nation from which they are trying to
achieve independence?
Following the logic of hostis humani generi, the insurgents would
not necessarily be pirates, because: (a) they would be attacking only
one nation; 155 and (b)the insurgents might have obtained, or may
soon be obtaining, legitimate belligerent rights. 156 If they blockaded

150.
See Halberstam, supra note 41, at 282 (citing Harvard Research, supra note
47, at 806).
151.
Halberstam, supra note 41, at 282.
152.
Barrios, supra note 112, at 161.
153.
Id. at 162.
154.
Halberstam, supra note 41, at 283.
155.
See id. at 276 ("Even those publicists who urged, and those states that
accepted, an exemption for insurgents extended it only to insurgents whose acts were
directed against a particular state.").
156.
As the Court in Ambrose Light explained, courts are precluded from:
[Riecognizing any new authority in foreign nations until the political or
executive department has done so. Until then, courts have no discretion in
holding all intentional, unlawful violence and injury to others as criminal. The
ulterior end and motive are, as I have said, not a justification in the courts,
whether that motive be plunder, a livelihood, political ambition, or patriotic
ardor.
United States v. Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
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or somehow attacked other nations' vessels, they would lose their
insurgency exemption but would not necessarily become pirates so
long as they maintained the status of lawful belligerents, thereby
affording other nations recourse to the laws of war for redress.
Consider the Achille Lauro incident in contrast with the famous
Santa Mariaincident of 1961. In the latter case, Captain Henriques
Galvao seized a Portuguese cruise ship on the high seas. 157 Captain
Galvao was a well-known political opponent of Portugal's Salazar
government, gave repeated assurances that he did not want to harm
any interests or nationals of other countries (though he did seize a
ship of some 600 mixed nationalities), and declared the seizure to be
"the first step aimed at overthrowing the Dictator Salazar of
Portugal."' 5 8 He was arguably less an enemy of all mankind than an
enemy of Portugal.
The PLF, on the other hand, attacked much more
indiscriminately, seizing an Italian vessel and killing an American
Jew. While
commentators disagree on whether Captain Galvao was a
"pirate,"'159 his case for the insurgency exemption is much stronger
than that of the PLF's. The United States, in fact, did consider
Captain Galvao a pirate, 160 but ultimately he received asylum in
Brazil where he docked the Santa Maria and was thus never tried.
Regardless, the Santa Maria incident does not demonstrate that
political motives alone immunize an individual from piracy,' 6 ' but
rather that a political decision on the international character of the
captor, based in part on the targets of the attack, does.
16 2
All
Thus, subjective intent does not matter beyond mens rea.
that does matter is the international character of the attack.
International recognition implies state commissioning. Diplomacy
and possibly even warfare would be the available forms of recourse.

157.
158.

Halberstam, supra note 41, at 286.
Id.

159.

Compare C. G. Fenwick, "Piracy"in the Caribbean, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 426,

426-27 (1961) (finding Galvao an insurgent but not affording him the insurgency
exemption from piracy because his attacks, while directed solely against Portugal,
involved attacks on civilians), with L. C. Green, The Santa Maria:Rebels or Pirates, 37
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 496, 503 (1961) (arguing that Galvao was not a pirate because,
among other factors, he did not seize the Santa Maria for "private ends"). Green, while
providing an excellent analysis of the insurgency exemption, nevertheless jumps to the
unsupported assertion that the "for private ends" language in the 1958 Geneva
Convention means that subjective personal motives, rather than international status,
is the dispositive determination. Green, supra, at 503.
160.
Id. at 496.
161.

Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 522 (1987) (citing the Santa Maria incident in 1961 for the proposition that
"[s]eizure of a ship for political purposes is not considered piracy").
162.
See, e.g., United States v. Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y.
1885).
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The lack of international recognition, on the other hand, allows
nations to treat the matter as criminal.
Given those two options, the choice must be taken seriously.
After the Khmer Rouge seized the U.S. container ship SS Mayaquez
sixty miles off the Cambodian coast, President Ford characterized the
attack as piracy. 163 Even though attacks by warships are not
normally piracy, President Ford nonetheless determined that the
Mayaquez seizure was an attack against a third-country by an
"illegitimate" government. 164 Thus, had the attackers been tried in
the United States, they could not have availed themselves of the
insurgency exception, regardless of their stated motives. But had the
United States treated the seizure as an act by a legitimate
government, it would have been justified in considering the attack an
act of war.
On the other hand, during the U.S. Civil War, the United States
recognized the Confederacy as having belligerent rights, and thus,
the U.S. courts never once executed a Confederate for the crime of
piracy. Those suspected of piracy, convicted, or both during the war
165
were either released or treated as prisoners of war.
In the case of Somalia today, it is far better to consider high seas
attackers as pirates. Recourse may be at the criminal, not national
level, and deterrence can be achieved without disrupting the
international order. As will be discussed below, captured pirates
would, and should, receive Geneva Conventions treatment, but they
should also remain eligible for prosecution.
All the facts support the treatment of the Somali attackers as
criminals, not as legitimate members of a government or as lawful
insurgents. The attackers are not striking the shipping of only one
nation, and certainly not that of Somalia or a faction thereof; they
attack indiscriminately. 166 There is nothing to indicate that they are
an insurgency at all. In fact, what some self-proclaimed spokesmen
for seized pirates are claiming is that the Somalis are actually
members of the legitimate Somali Coast Guard, guarding Somalia's

163.
Philip Shabecoff, White House Says Cambodia Seized a U.S. Cargo Ship,
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1975, at sec. 1, col. 8.
164.
Id.
165.
See United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1992). In
August, 1872, Bolles, the Solicitor of the Navy Department, discussed this issue in the
Atlantic Monthly, stating: "By establishing a blockade of Confederate ports, our
Government had recognized the Confederates as belligerents, if not as a belligerent
state, and had thus confessed that Confederate officers and men, military or naval,
could not be treated as pirates or guerrillas, so long as they obeyed the laws of war."
Id. (citations omitted).
166.
See Bo-Mi Lim, Militants Who Took Ship Deny Being Pirates, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 5, 2006, available at http://www.benadir-watch.com/2006%2News/0405_
Militants-deny-being-pirates.pdf.
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exclusive economic zone against unlicensed fishing. 167 Of course, the
ten suspected pirates the NASSAU Strike Group caught never
explained to any of us that they were Somali Coast Guard. Even if
such an assertion were true, neither the Safina al Bisarat nor the
Delta Ranger were fishing vessels.
Regardless, the Court in Ambrose Light has made it clear that
recognition of insurgency and lawful belligerency in U.S. courts is a
political decision binding on U.S. courts, just as is recognition of
nationhood. 168 There has been no global recognition of Somali
pirating as a function of a legitimate insurgency, let alone the
recognition of Somalia as a state with a coast guard. A prosecution in
U.S. courts should not fail on that basis.
Nowhere in the history of piracy is subjective intent dispositiveonly a supposed pirate's actions and status as lawful belligerents
are. 169 Conventional wisdom is wrong: terrorism on the high seas can
equal piracy.

See, e.g., id. Abdi Garaad Daahir, a militia spokesman, said that fighters
167.
from his clan had captured a South Korean vessel fishing illegally in Somalia's
territorial waters: "We are not pirates, but we are patriots who stood up to defend our
sea resources from those taking advantage of their country's lack of central government
and coastal guards." Id.
See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938)
168.
("What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state
is a political rather than a judicial question, and isto be determined by the political
branch of the government."); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is
the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question,
the determination of which by the legislative and executive branch of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as other officers, citizens and subjects of that
government."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 203 reporters' note 1 (1987) ("United States practice long reflected the view
that recognition of governments was not a matter of international obligation but could
be granted or withheld at will, to further national policy."). The "political question"
doctrine of U.S. constitutional law is most clearly expressed in the case of Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212-13 (1962) (specifically listing areas of, inter alia, international
treaty termination, recognition of belligerency abroad, and recognition of foreign
governments as ones generally unsuitable for judicial determination and which courts
will therefore leave to adjudication through political process). See also United States v.
Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63 (1897) ("[It belongs to the political department to
determine when belligerency shall be recognized, and its action must be accepted
according to the terms and intention expressed."); United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 144, 149 (1820) ("So far as this Court can take any cognizance of that fact,
Aury can have no power, either as Brigadier of the Mexican Republic, a republic of
whose existence we know nothing, or as Generalissimo of the Floridas, a province in
the possession of Spain, to issue commissions to authorize private or public vessels to
make captures at sea."); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634-35 (1818)
(holding that relations with foreign powers and the rights of part of a foreign empire
are questions "generally rather political than legal").
See, e.g., Klintock, 18 U.S. at 150-52; see also In re The Josefa Segunda, 18
169.
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 338, 358 (1820); supra note 140 and accompanying text. In Josefa
Segunda, the United States did not acknowledge the Republic of Venezuela as an
independent state at the time, but the Court recognized that it was "well known that
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C. Piracy Without a Second Vessel Can Remain Piracy
Now consider what would happen if the ten Somali pirates,
disguised as crewmembers, had boarded the Indian dhow while it had
been loading its cargo in Kismaayo, Somalia. As soon as the Safina
al Bisarat got underway, the Somalis overtook the vessel, sailed it
into the open ocean, and held the crew hostage for ransom. Piracy?
Yes. Once the attackers have overtaken the vessel and rejected
the authority of any state, including that of India, they become
lawless actors and enemies of all mankind. A plain reading of the
UNCLOS definition would, however, indicate that two ships are
required for piracy. Piracy, after all, according to UNCLOS consists
of "any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft," and directed on the high seas "against
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
17v0
ship or aircraft.
A look to the Harvard Research, however, indicates that the
intent was only to exclude criminal acts by one passenger or
crewmember against another, which were not tantamount to a revolt
against law itself: "[A] simple act of violence on the part of the crew or
passengers does not constitute in itself the crime of piracy, not at
least as far as international law is concerned." 171 Even a mutiny,
which seeks to supplant the leadership and "seize the ship," does "not
172
constitute acts of piracy."'
The case of The Creole (1841) proves instructive. A large number
of slaves aboard a U.S. merchant ship mutinied, murdered a
173
passenger, and then took the ship into the British port of Nassau.
174
The mutineers were tried for piracy and acquitted.
The British law
officers who advised Lord Stanley approved the result, though they
175
stated that the mutineers could be tried for murder.
Once a mutiny rejects the authority of any state, however, the
mutineers do become pirates. Even a warship can become a pirate

open war exists" between it and Spain, in which the United States maintained strict
neutrality. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 358. Given that state of things, the Court decided to
"respect the belligerent rights of both parties," and "not treat as pirates, the cruizers of
either, so long as they act under, and within the scope of their respective commissions."

Id.
170.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 101 (emphasis added).
171.
Summary Records of the 290th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37,
42, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1955 [hereinafter Summary Records] (quoting Harvard
Research, supra note 47, at 815).
172.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, supra note 148, at 282.
173.
2 LORD McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONs 79, 85-87 (1956).
174.
Id. at 85-87.
175.
Id.
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ship under UNCLOS if mutineers "take control of the ship" and then
engage in Article 101 acts. 176 Again, the piracy analysis turns on the
relationship among the act, actors, and states. The rapporteur for the
International Law Commission cited L. Oppenheim for the
"consensus of the legal opinion" that mutineers become pirates "when
the revolt is directed, not merely against the master, but also against
the vessel, for the purpose of converting her and her goods to their
own use." 177 At no point did he require that the mutiny somehow
involve a second ship to transform it into piracy.
No case law supports a two-ship requirement either. In fact, the
Queen's Bench in In re Tivnan found a seizure of a U.S. schooner
seized by Confederate passengers to be piracy jure gentium. 178
Gerald McGinley writes that there "seems to be no sound basis for
distinguishing acts of depredation perpetrated by those who boarded
from another ship. ''179 In his determination that the Santa Maria
incident was one of piracy, Fenwick states that it "matters not that
the act was begun on shore, by disguised entrance onto the ship."' 8 0
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the second part of the UNCLOS
8
definition noticeably contains no "against another ship" language.' '
Thus, once the Somalis took over, rejected the authority of any
state, and committed any other violent action on the high seas,
including the ongoing act of forcible detention, their ship became a
pirate ship, and their actions piracy. Similarly, the PLF hijackers
were pirates. Upon taking control of the Achille Lauro from within,
they continued their hostage-taking and committed a murder.1 8 2 In
both instances, the attackers' actions could not be attributed to any
one state, and their actions were not confined against any one state,
so the proper recourse is in universal jurisdiction.

176.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 102 ("The acts of piracy, as defined in
article 101, committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose
crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts
committed by a private ship or aircraft.").
177.
Summary Records, supra note 171, at 42 (quoting Harvard Research, supra
note 47, at 815).
178.
In re Tivnan, (1864) 122 Eng. Rep. 983, 986 (Q.B.).
179.
McGinley, supra note 116, at 697.
180.
Fenwick, supra note 159, at 428.
181.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 101. According to the Commentary, acts
committed outside the jurisdiction of any state were "chiefly" meant to include acts
committed by a ship or aircraft on an island constituting terra nullius or on the shores
of an unoccupied territory. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, supra note
148, at 282. However, it indicates that the drafters were not concerned with two ships
per se, only in preventing acts from "escaping all penal jurisdiction." Id.
182.
McGinley, supra note 116, at 700.
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D. Conclusion
Current international law is sufficient to effectively counter
piracy as well as maritime terrorism on the high seas. For an act in
international waters to qualify as piracy, and thereby for universal
jurisdiction to attach, the lack of state sanctioning is the
Without an established state connection,
determinative factor.
that the international community possess
requires
deterrence
optimal
the ability to capture and prosecute pirates and piratical terrorists.
With an established state connection, on the other hand, the
international community has recourse in diplomacy and warfare.
Given the satisfactory state of international law, there is a
distinct set of domestic and regional reforms that the United States
can alone undertake to help attain optimal deterrence. For those acts
committed within a nation's territorial seas, certain regional
measures, with the United States as potential catalyst, are necessary
to enhance the ability of governments to police their own waters.
These two subjects form the bases of the subsequent two sections.

III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF PIRATES AND THE SEVEN DOMESTIC
REFORMS THAT DERIVE FROM IT
I can say I know the world inside out, as you may see-that each of us
has the plague within him; no one, no one on earth is free from it. And I
know, too, that we must keep endless watch on ourselves lest in a
careless moment we breathe in somebody's face and fasten the infection
on him. What's natural is the microbe. All the rest-health, integrity,
purity (if you like)-is a product of the human will, of a vigilance that
must never falter. The good man, the man who infects hardly anyone, is
183
the man who has the fewest lapses.

On February 23, 2006, I testified against the ten suspected
pirates who attacked the Safina al Bisrat in their Mombasa, Kenya
trial. The defense counsel spent the vast majority of time on cross
examination accusing me of planting the evidence and of "trying to
get Somalia back for what it did to me in 1991." I eventually
responded in half-jest: "I was barely learning how to drive in 1991, I
have nothing against Somalia, or these ten defendants in particular."
"In fact," I added as the humid laughter died down, gesturing to
the defendants who had been smiling at me the whole time, "they
don't seem to have anything against me either," at which point the
defendants gave an enthusiastic thumbs up and their signature
toothy smile.

183.

CAMUS, supranote 1, at 229.
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Somalia is in a primordial existence, a nasty, brutish, and short
state of nature. No Somali we interviewed knew his birthday, his
parents, or how to read and write. Those who did not invoke their
Miranda rights, signed their advisement forms with an "X." Prior to
their attack on the Safina al Bisarat, they were in an open boat for
fifteen days on the seas, rationing infested rice, and taking turns
nibbling away on the remains of a shark. The youngest of the ten
visibly shook as he walked handcuffed into the office where we
conducted the interviews. When asked if he had any questions, he
responded: "I don't want to be shot."
On the other hand, the oldest of the ten, a man no more than
twenty-three years old, and whose body was scarred with knife and
bullet wounds, showed no fear. His eyes said that nothing we could
ever do would come close to what he had already seen and
experienced. "The Enforcer," as the Indian crewmembers referred to
him, sat in his chair, stretched, and yawned.
What did get through to each of them-and got through to them
in a bafflingly powerful way-was respect. At the end of my
testimony in the sweltering, subequatorial courthouse, the ten
suspects actually thanked me, through their defense counsel, for
"treating them so well," and with such "respect and dignity." I had
just spent hours on the stand testifying against them, and yet the ten
suspects considered me their friend. The African press, looking to
sensationalize, even had to admit that the suspects were "treated
fairly without abuse of their human rights. '18 4 Only months later,
after the magistrate found that they could stand trial in Kenya
despite their jurisdictional arguments and claims to being "mere
fishermen," did one of the suspected pirates try the torture angle.18 5
18 6
He could provide no details, however, of any alleged mistreatment
because, of course, none occurred.
Optimal deterrence turns on the proper application of both the
international laws of armed conflict and U.S. jurisprudence and
practice. Given the state of international law previously discussed,

184.

US Lawyer Testifies in Pirates Case, KENYA BROADCAST CORP., Feb. 25,

2006, http://www.kbc.co.ke/story.asp?ID=35264 (n.b.: a significant number of facts
within the article are erroneous. For example the prosecutor's name was not Beatrice
Jaden, who was actually the presiding magistrate, but Margaret Mgawi, and neither of
them would have "cross-examined" me, a government witness. Other factual errors
may also be due to difficulties in translation). For a considerably more accurate
account of my testimony, though still not perfect, see U.S. Navy Officer Tells Kenyan
Court That 10 Suspected Somalis PiratesClaimed They Were Fishermen, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 23, 2006, available at www.icc.co.hu/docstore/17-24February2006.doc?
PHPSESSID=2cb9d03b5c353c97d2e4e a3375f8dd71.
185.
Suspected Somali Pirate Accuses US of Torture, REUTERS, Aug. 3 2006,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2006/08/03/suspected_
somali-pirate-accuses us of torture.
186.
Id.
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accommodating and tailoring principles and practices of domestic
jurisprudence to naval constabulary missions will greatly assist in
the investigation, capture, detention, and prosecution of suspected
pirates. But it is equally essential to respect the internationallaws of
armed conflict as well, even though they do not technically apply to
law enforcement missions over pirates. The Law of Armed Conflict
applies "to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties."' 8 7 Pirates are not state actors.
Captive pirates are therefore not enemy prisoners of war
(EPWs). In fact, as has been discussed above and will be discussed
further below, their position as non-state, international criminals
subject to domestic laws achieves for them a rather distinct status.
Nonetheless, the Department of Defense requires that the armed
forces of the United States "will comply with the law of war during all
armed conflicts; however such conflicts are characterized, and unless
otherwise directed by competent authorities, will comply with the
principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations."'' 88
As well it should.
Applying these norms will help ensure: (1) that no conviction is
overturned for "due process" in any nation; (2) that any admissions
obtained remain admissible; (3) that more nations willingly seek to
join multi-lateral security operations, allow the United States to help
patrol their waters, or both; (4) that respect for the rule of law is
engendered among developing countries; and (5) that counter-piracy
operations do not, by engendering anti-U.S. hatred, transform mere
pirates into terrorists.
Through this new model of anti-piracy operations, the United
States can leverage the goodwill borne of a strategy of military
fortitude tempered with respectful treatment. It was no coincidence
that as the NASSAU Security Officer and the Author were considered
mild celebrities in Kenya, Kenya itself expressed interest in joining
the multi-national coalition patrolling the seas off Somalia. 189 It is
similarly not a coincidence that India joined the multi-national piracy
patrols of the Straits of Malacca less than a month after sixteen of its
crewmembers on one of its ships were saved from a piratical attack

187.
188.

Common Article 2 of the Five Geneva Conventions.

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 5810.01A,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM
5a (1999); see also DEP'T OF
DEF., DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (1998); DEP'TS OF THE ARMY, THE
NAVY, THE AIR FORCE & THE MARINE CORPS, OPNAVINST 3461.6, ENEMY PRISONERS
OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES & OTHER DETAINEES 1 1-5

(1997) [hereinafter OPNAVINST 3461.61.
189.
Kenya expressed those wishes during an international piracy conference
hosted by the Kenyan Ministry of Transportation in Mombasa, which happened to take
place at the exact same time as my testimony.
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with international news coverage. 190 It would be foolish to say that
they joined because of the NASSAU Strike Group's actions, 191 but it
would be fair to say that both countries would be more hesitant to
join had the capture and seizure caused international controversy.
Foreign policy, contrary to the tenets of classical realists, is often a
192
"bottom-up" product.
Most important, in a world in which anger against the United
States is exploited by fundamentalist demagogues into anti-American
fanaticism, treating all those the United States relentlessly pursues
with exceptional respect and dignity will not only keep our antipiracy efforts from triggering a terrorist mutation, especially in a
destitute and predominantly Muslim country like Somalia, but it will
actually help make converts. The United States could always use the
93
image-enhancement.1
Thus, the United States should undertake the following seven
domestic proposals at the intersection of domestic and international
law and at the crossroads of law and strategy. First, the United
States should better adapt rules of criminal procedure to ensure
Fourth Amendment safeguards while accommodating the realities of
naval law enforcement, perhaps even by applying the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) to captured pirates. Second, the United
States should ensure Fifth Amendment protections while ensuring

190.
See India - New Delhi to Join Malacca Patrols, PERISCOPE DAILY DEF.
NEWS CAPSULES, Feb. 24, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 3270223; India: Admiral
Bhasin Talks About Submarine Training, Drills With Foreign Navies, WORLD NEWS,
Mar. 1, 2006, available at http://www.xignite.com/xWorldNews.aspx?articleid=
SAP20060326016011.
191.
For a discussion on India's strategic decision to join the patrols in the
Straits, see Amit Kumar, Strait Talk in Malacca, INST. FOR PEACE & CONFLICT STUD.,
Feb. 6, 2006, available at http://www.ipcs.org/printIndiaArticle.jsp?action=showView&
kValue=1936&status=article&keyArticle=lO15.
192.
See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997). Moravcsik argues that
liberal theory rests on a "bottom-up" view of politics in which "the demands of
individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics." Id. at 517.
"Political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, understood as
an aggregation of boundedly rational individuals with differentiated tastes, social
commitments, and resource endowments." Id.
193.
In a response to a 2005 Pew Research Group international poll finding the
United States' image abroad still in the negative column, especially in the Muslim
world, Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said the United States could
"improve our image if we undertake humanitarian tasks, if we support democracy
without imposing democracy, and that we can mitigate some of our problems if we take
other countries' national interests into calculations as we create our own." Poll Finds
America's Image Still Negative Abroad, VOICE OF AM., June 24, 2005, availableat 2005
WLNR 9989354. In 2005, President Bush was sufficiently concerned about the United
States' image that he appointed his long-time confidante, Karen Hughes, to head up
the task of public diplomacy. See Steven R. Weisman, Bush Confidante Begins Task of
RepairingAmerica's Image Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at 1.6.
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the most effective investigations and prosecutions, perhaps by using
the anti-racketeering model. Third, while that investigatory model
should incorporate a statistical "pin-mapping" approach, the United
States should not rely too heavily on the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) provisions within the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) to provide a reliable
maritime picture. Fourth, the United States needs to provide better
training to visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) teams in evidence
collection and documentation. Fifth, the United States could consider
employing a carefully planned, and legally sound, military subterfuge
known as a Q-Ship to capture and deter pirates. Sixth, the United
States should adopt a very limited policy of entry within twelve
nautical miles of Somalia.
Finally, the United States should
complement all the above efforts by conducting an Information
Operations (1O) campaign to ensure the broadest dissemination of its
deterrence efforts, while ensuring that the United States maintains
the high ground essential to the war on terrorism.
A. Affording Fourth Amendment Protection Rights at Sea
According to Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1640.9C, afloat
brigs such as the one on the USS NASSAU are not certified to house
those, like pirates, who are not subject to the UCMJ without express
waiver from the Secretary of Defense or designee.1 94 However, seized
pirates are likely to be dangerous individuals, especially if they are
also terrorists, and thus need to be detained in secure facilities.
When the NASSAU Strike Group found itself in this position, it filed
for a specific waiver to use NASSAU's ten-person brig. Rather than
have future groups go through the waiver process, it would be more
efficient to amend the regulation to accommodate naval constabulary
missions.
However, such a straightforward change reveals the presence of
a larger issue: the afloat justice system is not sufficiently attuned to
deal with constabulary missions. 195 The ten suspected Somali

194.

SECY OF THE NAVY, SECNAVINST 1640.9C, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CORRECTIONS MANUAL T 7105

(2006).

195.
It is worth noting at this point that the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18
U.S.C.A. § 1385 (West 2006), which prohibits the willful use of the Army or Air Force to
execute the laws, does not bar naval constabulary missions. First, the PCA only
applies in the absence of constitutional or congressional authorization. "Public armed
vessels" are specifically authorized to "subdue, seize, take, and send" pirates into "any
port of the United States." 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 381, 382 (West 2006). Additionally, the
United States has specifically signed onto the 1958 Geneva Convention with its piracyrepression obligations. International agreements are "law of the United States."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111

(1987).

Furthermore, since the courts have refused to extend the reach of the PCA to
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pirates, for example, remained in U.S. custody for eight days before
being transferred to Kenya for prosecution. Indeed, those captured
on the high seas will typically have to wait a long time in the brig
before the interested states make a decision on who is best to
prosecute. Such a decision will likely first require a trip by U.S.
investigators to the ship (often an extended process in and of itself), a
series of interviews, and a decision by the U.S. Attorney in
Washington, D.C. If the United States declines to prosecute, then the
diplomatic process of seeking the appropriate state continues in
earnest, and the transit to that state begins. Until the handover to
prosecuting authorities, no probable cause determination is made, no
formal charges are levied, and the suspects remain confined.
Were pirates non-citizen enemy combatants, extended detention
without probable cause determination, charges, or trial would not
present a legal problem. 19 6 They could not, however, be placed in an
afloat brig for other than transit purposes 19 7 and must be repatriated
at the end of the conflict. 198 As Professors Goodman and Jenks also

the Navy or Marine Corps, see United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1991); U.S. v. Acosta-Cartagena, 128 F.Supp.2d 69, 71 (D.P.R. 2000) (stating that PCA
"prohibits the Army or Air Force from enforcing civilian law, but not the Navy"), there
is no controlling statute that would trump the customary international law obligations
under UNCLOS. See discussion infra Part IlI.E. Second, the PCA imposes no
restriction on the use of U.S. armed forced abroad, since Congress intended to preclude
military intervention in domestic civil affairs. See Yunis, 924 F.2d. at 1093. See
generally Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act, 13 OP. OFF. LEGAL
COUNSEL 321 (1989) (opining that the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply outside the
territory of the United States); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act:
Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 383 (2003) (arguing
that if the military is to be handed an ongoing law enforcement role the bright line
should be drawn "at the borders"). Third, while military regulations extend the
requirements of the PCA to the Navy via DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5525.5, DOD
COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS encl. 4,
3 (1986)
[hereinafter DIRECTIVE 5525.5] and SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, SECNAVINST 5820.7B,
COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
9 (1988), the Defense
Department has directed that the Navy or Marine Corps may still conduct missions
"undertaken for a primarily military or foreign affair's [sic] purpose." DIRECTIVE
5525.5, supra, at encl. 4,
1.2.1.6. Fourth, in refusing to extend the reach of the PCA
to the Navy, courts have also refused to extend the exclusionary rule to any violations.
See Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1093.
196.
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) ("The purpose of
detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and
taking up arms once again," not punishment) (internal citations omitted).
197.
OPNAVINST 3461.6, supra note 188, 2-1(b).
198.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 75, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2055
(providing that repatriation should be accomplished with the least possible delay after
conclusion of peace); Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 20,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2301 (stating "conclusion of peace"); Hague Convention on Laws
and Customs of War on Land art. 20, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1817 (providing as soon as
possible after "conclusion of peace").
If convicted of war crimes, however, those
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persuasively contend, they would also be entitled to "minimum
procedural guarantees" of procedural rights under the Geneva
Conventions, both for their initial seizure, and for their continued
detention. 199 If the pirates were non-citizen terrorists, they could
also be subject to extended detention until the resolution of the war
on terrorism and would likely be transferred to a shore-based facility
like Camp Delta. 200 At Guantanamo Bay, the detainees would also
have the right to appear before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT) to determine whether they were enemy combatants. 20 1 The
extent of any further procedural rights is a subject of intense debate,
but at a minimum, even terrorists have some procedural guarantees.
But what about a non-citizen, non-terrorist pirate?
As already discussed, pirates are not technically within the Law
of Armed Conflict. 20 2 It is nevertheless possible that a court could
hold that humanitarian principles of international law legally require
that basic minimum procedural standards apply to all detained
individuals. Furthermore, any piracy prosecutions under the SUA
Convention will entail certain due process rights, including the right
of the defendant to inform his state "without delay" and to be visited
by a representative of his state. 20 3 In addition, states are directed to
deal with the case "in the same manner as in the case of any other

individuals may be detained beyond the end of hostilities. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785-86 (1950).
199.
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, InternationalLaw, U.S. War Powers, and
the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2659 (2005); see also
1-6.
OPNAVINST 3461.6, supra note 188,
200.
Approximately two months after the September 11, 2001 attacks, President
Bush issued a Military Order that required the detention-and military trial if
criminal charges were filed-of non-citizens who the President had "reason to believe":
(a) were members of Al Qaeda; (b) were involved in specified ways in present or
potential future activities with "adverse effects on the United States, its citizens,
national security, foreign policy, or economy"; or (c) had knowingly harbored any of the
former individuals. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment and
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 2(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833
(Nov. 16, 2001). There is no time limit on the period of detention. Id.
201.

PAUL WOLFOWITZ,

DEPUTY SEC'Y

OF DEF.,

MEMORANDUM

FOR

THE

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d2004O7O7review.pdf. Here, the status must be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence to three commissioned military officers. See GORDON ENGLAND, SEC'Y OF THE
FOR DISTRIBUTION
(July 29, 2004),
available at
NAVY,
MEMORANDUM
Under the CSRT, the
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d2004730comb.pdf.
rules of evidence are relaxed, and a non-lawyer represents the detainee. Id. Once the
government makes this showing, it may confine the detainees for the duration of the
combat, namely the confrontation with Al Qaeda, provided they still pose a threat. See
GORDON ENGLAND, SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION (Sept. 14,

available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/d20040914admin
2004),
review.pdf (establishing the annual Administrative Review Procedures for enemy
combatants).
202.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203.
SUA Convention, supra note 91, at art. 7.
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offence of a grave nature under the law of that State, '20 4 which not
only requires international due process rights, including a
20 5
preliminary hearing to determine sufficiency of evidence for trial,
but it may require a state such as the United States to afford the
defendant its own procedural safeguards.
So what are those procedural rights in the United States that
might apply, and would those rights apply regardless of the SUA
Convention if the United States prosecuted suspected non-citizen,
non-terrorist pirates?
First, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,20 6 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment's protections against illegal
searches, seizures, and arrests do not apply abroad to non-U.S.
citizens, even when such illegal acts are perpetrated by U.S. agents.
The court stated: "There is likewise no indication that the Fourth
Amendment was understood by contemporaries of the Framers to
apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in
'20 7
foreign territory or in international waters.
However, a piracy prosecution under the SUA Convention, a
treaty which the United States has ratified, could nonetheless oblige
the United States to provide the full complement of Fourth
Amendment protections.
International law and international
agreements of the United States are law of the United States and
208
supreme over the law of the several states.
Aside from the rare SUA prosecution, however, the Supreme
Court's holding in Verdugo-Urquidez seemingly gives a blank check to
naval constabulary operations for warrantless arrests and indefinite

204.
Id. at art. 10.1.
205.
The language in Article 10.1 of the SUA Convention, supra note 91,
mirrors, though not identically, the language of Article 7 of the Hague Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860
U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971). As Christopher Joyner explains, "this
language preserves for the alleged offender the rights of due process, a fair trial, and
guarantees the concept of innocent until proven guilty. Presumably,an investigation
into the facts of the allegation against an accused offender determines whether to

proceed to the trial phase." Christopher C. Joyner, International Extradition and
Global Terrorism: Bringing International Criminals to Justice, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 493, 512-13 (2002) (emphasis added).
206.
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
207.
Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
208.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 111 (1987). The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that treaties
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land" and that the "Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. It may be possible to argue, however, that
the SUA Convention Article 10.1 is not binding on the courts because the SUA
Convention is not self-executing. See § 111. See generally Malvina Halberstam,
United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 49 (1997) for an

excellent discussion on the constitutionality of non self-executing treaties.
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detentions on the high seas. After all, the rules of U.S. criminal
procedure requiring a warrant prior to arrest, or a forty-eight hour
probable cause determination subsequent to an arrest without a
warrant, were designed to effectuate the Fourth Amendment. 209 The
military's forty-eight hour probable cause determination, 210 seventytwo hour requirement of a command memorandum detailing the
probable cause for pretrial restraint, 211 and the initial review officer's
(IRO's) independent determination of probable cause would also be
inapplicable, 212 since these requirements are based on the Fourth
Amendment.
What would happen, however, if one day seized, suspected pirates
turned out to be the legitimate fishermen they claimed to be? What
would happen if the courts, concerned with that possibility, for example,
began to expand the reach of Fourth Amendment protections to noncitizen suspected pirates? The Safina al Bisaratpirates were availed of
neither the civilian nor military procedures. Even if they were explicitly
required, the former would not have been practicably available off the
coast of Somalia, and the latter did not apply to them. Would effective
U.S. prosecution be hamstrung from the beginning?
The scenario is not inconceivable. One way in which a court could
apply Fourth Amendment strictures to suspected non-citizen pirates is
through recognizing that a U.S.-flagged vessel is floating U.S.
214
territory, 213 as is a U.S. warship within which detention would occur.

209.
See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) ("[A]
jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of
arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of
Gerstein."); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-19 (1975) (holding unconstitutional
Florida procedures under which persons arrested without a warrant could remain in
police custody for thirty days or more without a judicial determination of probable
cause).
210.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2005), R.C.M. 305(i)(1)
[hereinafter R.C.M.]; see also Courtney v. Williams, 1 M.J. 267, 270 (C.M.A. 1976)
(holding, in reference to Gerstein, that "those procedures required by the Fourth
Amendment in the civilian community must also be required in the military
community," unless military necessity required a different rule). The court also held
that, since bail does not exist in the military, "a neutral and detached magistrate must
decide more than the probable cause question." Courtney, 1 M.J. at 271. "A magistrate
must decide if a person could be detained and if he should be detained." Id. "The
purpose of RCM 305 was to comply with Gerstein and Courteny and their progeny."
United States v. Rexroat, 38 M.J. 292, 295 (C.M.A. 1993).
211.
R.C.M., supra note 210, at 305(h)(2)(A)-(C).
212.
R.C.M., supra note 210, at 305(i)(2). Note that the IRO does not review the
commander's decision for an abuse of discretion; rather, he makes an independent decision
of probable cause and necessity.
213.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 92 ("Ships shall sail under the flag of one
State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international
treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high
seas.").
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The Supreme Court has recognized that aliens are "persons" entitled
to constitutional protection before being criminally sanctioned. 215
While later the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez limited these
constitutional protections, they did require them when the aliens
"have come within the territory of the United States and have
developed substantial connections with this country. ' 2 16 So, if an
attacker fires upon or illegally boards a U.S. vessel, he may be deemed
to be sufficiently encroaching upon U.S. territory to subject himself both
to U.S. jurisdiction and constitutional protection, just as if he were
assaulting persons in Nebraska.
Furthermore, while the Verdugo-Urquidez majority hinted in
dicta that the substantial connections must be "voluntary," they did
leave open the fact that involuntary detention within the United
217
States, at some point, could lead to Fourth Amendment protection.
How long a suspected, non-citizen, non-enemy combatant, nonterrorist must endure detention before he is invested with the legal
right for an independent review of his detention has yet to be decided.
Verdugo-Urquidez offered a case-by-case "substantial connections"
test, and only ruled on a Fourth Amendment search in the case, not
the more serious matter of an arrest. Moreover, as Justice Harlan
put it, "the question of which specific safeguards ... are appropriately
to be applied in a particular context ...can be reduced to the issue of
what process is 'due' a defendant in the particular circumstances of a
'218
particular case.
In the face of any military operation, foreseeable uncertainty
should be limited wherever possible. Prosecutors will no doubt find
succor in the plenary power doctrine in which the Court, by deferring
to Congress and the executive branch, has stripped away much of the
promised constitutional protection. 219 And even if a U.S. court were
to apply some measure of the Fourth Amendment to seized pirates,
there is flexibility in the current rules. In addition to rejecting the
proposition that a probable cause hearing is only prompt under Gerstein
when
provided
"immediate [ly]"
upon
completion
of the

214.
High Seas Convention, supra note 26, at art. 8; UNCLOS, supra note 25, at
arts. 32, 95, 236.
215.
See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (aliens
protected by Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886) (aliens protected by Fourteenth Amendment); see also discussion on Fifth
Amendment application infra Part III.B.
216.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
217.
Id. at 271-72 ("The extent to which respondent might claim the protection
of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the United States were to be
prolonged-by a prison sentence, for example-we need not decide.").
218.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
219.
See generally Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the
Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing

the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965 (1993).
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"administrative steps incident to arrest," 220 McLaughlin allows the
Government to demonstrate "the existence of a bona fide emergency or
other extraordinary circumstance" which caused it to hold a probable
cause determination beyond forty-eight hours. 22 1 The fact that the
holding facility is in the middle of the ocean, thousands of miles from
the United States, could qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance."
Accordingly, the military has a specific "at sea" exception to its normal
222
procedural requirements.
However, in part to mitigate uncertainty, the United States should
consider extending UCMJ jurisdiction to seized pirates and availing
itself of the specific "at sea" exception up front. Additionally, all the
military's procedural safeguards in most circumstances can be executed
on board the larger naval vessels in which suitable brigs exist, thereby
demonstrating the procedural fairness to a later court as well as to
other nations. If probable cause to establish an individual's guilt for
piracy does not exist, he may be repatriated, 223 while the others are
detained until transfer to Court Martial. Finally, UCMJ jurisdiction
allows a properly constituted Court Martial to try suspected pirates
anywhere, including on a ship or on an overseas U.S. military base,
thereby limiting the logistical and political costs of transporting them
from the Indian Ocean to the United States. Civilians are already
subject to the UCMJ for General Courts Martial under the "law of
war," 224 and the applicable U.S. Code sections could be incorporated
into the UCMJ via Article 134.225

220.
221.
222.

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1991).
Id. at 57.
See R.C.M., supranote 210, at 305(m)(2).

[Clonfinement on board the vessel at sea may continue only until the [accused]
can be transferred to a [brig ashore]. Such transfer shall be accomplished at
the earliest opportunity permitted by the operational requirements and mission
of the vessel. Upon such transfer [the command memorandum must be
transmitted to the IRO and must include an explanation of the delay.]
223.
Of course, repatriation to a country like Somalia is no small task.
Repatriation via ship directly to Somalia would require entry into Somali waters and
ports and would thus likely be prohibitively dangerous given the task. Repatriation at
sea could run afoul of the obligation to assist mariners at sea under Article 12 of the
High Seas Convention, supra note 26, and Article 98 of UNCLOS, supra note 25,
depending on the condition of their original craft, the condition of the individuals
themselves, and the distance from the shore. Based on the clan structure and the
warring factions within Somalia, repatriation would also have to occur off friendly turf.
Finally, repatriation through another country like Kenya or Djibouti would require
heavy involvement by the Department of State followed by a dangerous overland
transfer. Given the warlike state of Somalia, would repatriation involve re-arming the
released individual? If not, would repatriation without re-arming be like releasing a
de-clawed cat into the woods? Even after convicted Somali pirates are released from
prison, assuming no life sentence, the same issue of repatriation would apply.
224.
R.C.M., supra note 210, at 202(b), 203. It is also worth mentioning that
detained persons are subject to punishment under the UCMJ and other U.S. laws,
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Lastly, extending Fourth Amendment procedural guarantees, even
through the UCMJ, will help improve the United States' image abroad
and thereby attract more coalition support and regional accord. Doing
so will also continue to educate nations on the value of the rule of
law.22 6 Entitlement debates notwithstanding, it is certainly clear to say
that not providing the full complement of procedural rights in the past
has cost the United States valuable political capital and has somewhat
22 7
shaded its otherwise brilliant rule of law beacon.
B. Affording Fifth Amendment Rights While MaintainingEffective
Investigations
Because captured pirates are criminals, not EPWs, they may face
prosecution in domestic courts, including those of the United States.
Do the Fifth Amendment safeguards, including the right against selfincrimination, apply?
They should. In any criminal proceeding, once the government
detains an individual, the Constitution safeguards him against
compelled self-incrimination. 228 The accused is permitted not to
testify in court, 229 and while in custody, he has a right to make no

regulations, and orders in force during the time of their detention. See OPNAVINST
3-7.
3461.6, supra note 188,
225.
Article 134 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, . . . all . . . crimes and

offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty,
shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the
discretion of that court.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2005), punitive art. 134(a).
226.
See, e.g., Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav Crimes Tribunal: A Prosecutor's
View, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 187, 194-95 (1995).
There is one central point on which all of us at the Office of the Prosecutor, no
matter what country or legal system we come from, agree, and for which we
needed no debate: our determination that the prosecutions be, and be perceived
to be, fair. . . . We hope that by convicting those most responsible for the
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia we will help to demonstrate that justice is
possible. We hope our work will help to restore the rule of law in that part of
the world, and at the same time confirm the fundamental underpinnings for
international humanitarian law that will serve us all well into the next
century.
227.
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, United States: Guantdnamo Two Years
on-U.S. Detentions Undermine the Rule of Law, Jan. 9, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/
englishldocs/2004/01/09/usdom6917.htm.
228.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.... ").
229.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326-27 (1999); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965).
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statements. 230 Any statements he does make while in custody have
to be the product of a knowing and voluntary waiver lest they be
suppressed. 231 The NASSAU Strike Group took great pains to
explain those rights to all the Somalis it captured. The Somalis,
however, had no concept of a "right," and it was not until "right" was
re-translated into "power" that they truly began to understand.
The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez has been interpreted by later
courts to limit Fifth Amendment application to aliens in the same
manner as it did the Fourth Amendment.2 32 But, just as with the
Fourth Amendment, once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all
"persons" within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence in the country is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent. 23 3 At some point in their detention on sovereign U.S.
territory, albeit floating, the suspected pirates will be considered
"within the United States," or to have developed "substantial
connections" thereto. They will certainly be within the United States
if tried by U.S. courts. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the United
States should honor the Fifth Amendment with respect to captured
pirates.
Effective prosecutions, the rule of law example, and
maximum coalition involvement are optimized by affording Fifth
Amendment protections.
Of course, from a purely investigatory and law-enforcement
perspective, there are familiar downsides to complying with the Fifth
Amendment. With piratical terrorists, there will be an urgency to

230.
See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-35 (2000); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
231.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Even though a defendant may make a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights as a matter
of fact, the courts will still look at whether, "under the totality of the circumstances,"
the challenged statement was involuntary. Id. at 502-03 (Clark, J., dissenting). A
court may find that a defendant made a valid waiver and yet still hold that a
confession was involuntary if it finds some form of coercion. Miranda,384 U.S. 436; see
also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (laying out additional safeguards to
ensure the waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary); Henderson v.
DeTella, 97 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 1996).
232.
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that
certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders."); see also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (holding that Fifth Amendment
protections do not extend to aliens outside the territorial boundaries); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784-85 (1950) (same).
233.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590, 596-98 & n.5 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); cf.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("[A]liens who
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process
of law.").
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finding out what other information they possess. The government
must often forgo the possibility of prosecuting the suspect in order to
compel that individual to provide information. That said, even in the
absence of a Self-Incrimination Clause violation, there are domestic
limits on the government's use of coercive interrogation techniques
designed to extract information from individuals-as well there
23 4
should be.
With non-terrorist pirates, there is less urgency but still great
value in obtaining information beyond the individual actor and his
involvement with the particular incident. Modern day piracy is a
criminal enterprise. 235 Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the
International Chamber of Commerce's Commercial Crime Services,
described piratical hijacking as typically involving "a mother ship
from which to launch the attacks, a supply of automatic weapons,
false identity papers for the crew and vessel, fake cargo documents,
and a broker network to sell the stolen goods illegally. '2 36 "Individual
pirates," he added, "don't have these resources. Hijackings are the
'237
work of organized crime rings.
On the NASSAU, however, concern for the perceived Fifth
Amendment "voluntariness" of statements kept the NASSAU Strike
Group intelligence department from any direct questioning that
would have extended beyond the circumscribed facts. The concern
was that afloat naval intelligence could be perceived as unduly
coercive, mostly by judges or juries who view intelligence agencies as
"spies" trained more in the practice of interrogation than in
interviewing. Lieutenant Commander Rory Berke, the NASSAU
Strike Group Intelligence Officer, observed the initial biographical
interviews of the ten captured Somalis, which the Author conducted.

234.

See, e.g., Chavez v. Martin, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003).

ARMY FIELD MANUAL,

See also THE U.S.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS,

FM 2-22.3

(2006).
235.

See, e.g., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 14,

at 5 ("Today's pirates and criminals are usually well organized and well equipped with
advanced communications, weapons, and high-speed craft."); LANGEWIESCHE, supra
note 12, at 46-61 (describing the "elaborate plot" of the sophisticated pirates who
attacked the ALONDRA RAINBOW in the Strait of Malacca in October 1999); Luft &
Korin, supra note 125, at 61; Tom Maliti, 21st Century Pirates: Well-Armed, Organized:
Better-Equipped Attackers Grow More Ruthless, Violent, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 20,
2005, at A28; Zoltan Isvan, Piracy Rises Again on the High Seas, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
TODAY, Dec. 19, 2002, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/12/1219_021219_
tvpiracy.html ("Pirates attack with guns, parangs (a machete common in Indonesia
and Malaysia) and, on occasion, dynamite. The new breed-decidedly not the
swashbuckling pirates of lore--can range from local seamen looking for quick cash to
organized-crime gangs and rogue military units.").
236.
Grant Holloway, Triads Behind Ship Hijackings, CNN, Feb. 5, 2002,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/20021WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/04/malaysia.
piracy/.
237.
Id.

54

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40.1

In that short time alone, he found "immensely valuable
information."' 23 8 With his intricate knowledge of Somalia, its clan
structure and dynamics, and the latest intelligence on piracy, he was
able to make strong horizontal and vertical connections that outside
investigators, whether from the FBI or the Naval Criminal
Investigative Services (NCIS), would likely not have made, at least
not so readily.
However, once NCIS and the FBI took over,
Lieutenant Commander Berke was not even permitted to observe the
23 9
criminal interviews, only to brief the FBI and NCIS in advance.
'240
According to Lieutenant Commander Berke: "That cost us a lot.
Applying the Fifth Amendment should not chill criminal
intelligence interviews into the vast piratical enterprise. 241 Being
overly cautious, while not nearly as bad as being insufficiently
cautious, is still inefficient. The United States needs to investigate
this crime as if it were conducting a racketeering or terrorism
investigation, not just a crime of circumscribed facts.
Afloat
intelligence officers are highly trained analysts who specialize in
analyzing political, military, and strategic data. As the Attorney
General's Guidelines and long-standing FBI practice demonstrates,
the admissibility of criminal interviews is little threatened by
intelligence interrogations, so long as the laws of criminal
procedure, 242 other applicable U.S. guidelines, 243 and international
due process 24 4 are meticulously followed. There is no question that
afloat naval intelligence officers can respect those rules and
guidelines. Afloat intelligence officers on piracy missions should

238.
Interview with Rory V. Berke, Lieutenant Commander, NASSAU, (Mar. 1,
2006) [hereinafter Interview with Berke].
239.
It is useful to keep in mind that Naval vessels are not designed as floating
police stations. On the NASSAU, there were no rooms with two-way mirrors and
intercoms, so there was no way to observe unseen. There was also no way to set up a
closed-circuit television. Interviews took place in the ship's library and in the print
shop office, located right by the brig.
240.
Interview with Berke, supra note 238.
241.
GENERAL

See, e.g., JOHN ASHCROFT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON
CRIMES,
RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE
AND TERRORISM
ENTERPRISE

INVESTIGATIONS

(2002),

http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf

[hereinafter

GUIDELINES].

242.
See cases cited supra note 232.
243.
GUIDELINES, supra note 241, at 19-20.
244.
See, e.g., Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam art. 19(e), Aug. 5,
1990, available at http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislam1990.htm; Banjul
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7(1)(b)-(d), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M.
1391, 1423-24 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]; American Convention on Human Rights
arts. 7(5), 8(2), 8(2)(d), 8(2)(f), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 5(3)-(4), 6(2),
6(3)(c)-(d), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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receive training in criminal intelligence interviews, as distinct from
the military's traditional focus on more tactical questioning. Not only
will that allow for valuable intelligence gathering, but it will also help
defuse future defense counsel charges of inappropriate questioning.
If a prosecutor has an intelligence officer who can confidently explain
the procedures and considerations of a criminal interview, as well as
demonstrate that the prosecutor followed official guidance, she will
245
have a strong position for defeating a motion to suppress.
And the benefits of fusing the Navy's core intelligence capacity
with its burgeoning constabulary capacity are enormous. Onboard,
these highly skilled analysts specialize in counter-piracy and counterterrorism intelligence and have the vast "maritime knowledge" the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) deems "essential" to
effective piracy investigations. 246 Questioning seized suspects beyond
their personal involvement in the crime will help reveal the
horizontal and vertical links that will prove critical to the future
detection, prevention, and prosecution of the piratical enterprise.
Understanding common tactics, techniques, and protocols is critical to
identifying future miscreants and to anticipating their actions.
Additionally, as the IMO notes, it is "also probable that offenders will
be involved in other offences such as carrying illegal immigrants, and
useful intelligence may be lost if investigators are too
compartmentalised in their approach. 2 4 7
Intelligence derived from those captured not only provides
details as to the nature and structure of the enterprise, but can also
directly, or through statistical analysis, allow appropriate patrols to
be dispatched to appropriate locations. This practice maximizes, or at
least helps deter, future attacks. The IMB, for example, rightfully
attributed the 16% drop in Indonesian piracy attacks from 2004 to
2005 to not only an increased "show of force," but to "several
intelligence-led actions that resulted in gangs of pirates being
248
caught."
Beginning in the 1990s, New York City began to make historic
strides in crime prevention through the implementation of Computer

245.
It is also recommended that the interviews be videotaped to prove to the
courts that all information was voluntarily obtained and that all the rules of criminal
procedure and international law were followed.
246.
IMO Resolution A.922(22), Code of Practice for the Investigation of the
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 5.1 (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter
IMO Resolution A.922(22)] ("It is essential that those employed by security force
agencies to investigate piracy or armed robbery against ships shall have demonstrated
investigation skills and competencies, as well as maritime knowledge/experience.").
247.
Id.
248.

2005 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
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Comparison Statistics, or "CompStat," 249 which could serve as a
model for the Navy's own law enforcement missions. On a weekly
basis, statistical summaries of the week's crime complaints, arrest,
and summons activity from New York City's seventy-six precincts,
nine Police Service Areas, and twelve Transit Districts were collated
and fed into a city-wide database. 250 Not only was the nature of the
crime, the location, and the time fed into the statistical map, but far
more detailed information about the victim, the type of attack, and
other crime-specific details were as well. 251 All of those details
enabled police to identify trouble spots in New York City, spot
emerging patterns, and target the appropriate resources to fight
crime strategically.
Maritime security operations can also benefit from this hightechnology "pin-mapping" approach. By affording intelligence officers
access to seized pirates, the data fed into the statistical map will be
more than just radar hits and signal intelligence. The Navy will be
able to more quickly identify active areas and fashion a
comprehensive response. Moreover, by sharing this information with
coalition partners (subject to releasability concerns of course), the
United States can further a "common operating picture," resulting in
better policing of what Admiral William Fallon calls the "vast
252
ungoverned or weakly controlled space" known as the oceans.
C. The Limited Role of AIS Within the SOLAS Convention
AIS is a mandatory global system within SOLAS, designed to
provide ship name, IMO number, destination, empirical data,
position, course, and speed on an autonomous and continuous
broadcast system operating in the VHF maritime mobile band, and it
could also significantly add to that common operating picture. 253 The
system was primarily designed as a cheap and effective collision
avoidance tool for commercial vessels and as an automatic tracking
system for harbor authorities. 254 However, through a somewhat

249.
See WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND:
AMERICA'S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 233-39 (1998).

How

250.
See New York City Police Department,
COMPSTAT
Process,
http://www.nyc.govfhtml/nypd/html/chfdept/compstat-process.html
(last visited Nov.
20, 2006).
251.
Id.
252.
Jim Garamone, Piracy in Straits Highlights Need for Maritime Security,
AM. FORCES INFO. SERVICE, June 9, 2005, http://www.defenselink.milnews/Jun2005/
20050605_1559.html.
253.
See U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, AIS Overview, http://www.
navcen.uscg.gov/enav/ais/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
254.
See generally M.J. LEWANDOWSKI & D.J. PIETRASZEWSKI, AUTOMATIC
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM: A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATION, AND
IMPLEMENTATION (2002), available at http://www.rdc.uscg.gov/iws/pubs/ais-paper.pdf.
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manpower-intensive process, AIS information can be hand-fed into
the Navy's Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-

M).
On close inspection, however, the overall benefits of such a high
fidelity picture for constabulary operations are limited. First, AIS is
255
not required in all vessels, particularly those of less than 600 tons.
Much of the small Taiwanese fishing dhows that are the prime
targets of the Somali pirates, for example, are exempt from the
SOLAS requirement, as was the Safina al Bisarat.256 Obviously, no
pirate skiff would equip itself with AIS either.
Second, while all ships fitted with AIS must maintain the AIS in
operation at all times (except where international agreements, rules,
or standards provide for the protection of navigational information),
SOLAS specifically authorizes masters to turn off the device "where
continued operation of the AIS would pose a higher risk" to the safety
and security of his ship. 25 7 Continued use of AIS while transiting
areas known for incidents of armed robbery and piracy, such as the
Straits of Malacca, is specifically mentioned as a situation which may
be such a high risk.258 Indeed, masters are concerned that pirates
will better target their vessel if AIS is on, and some in fact shut the
system off when going through pirate-infested seas. 25 9 While there is
no evidence that pirates, at least off Somalia, are using AIS to select
their targets, it is certainly conceivable that they could do so by
mother-shipping from their primitive skiffs to larger vessels outfitted
with AIS. They would then use that ship's AIS to target even larger
vessels.
Third, the global AIS picture is easily obtainable on the internet,
exposing an area of vulnerability that potential pirates or terrorists
can exploit to gain information and operating patterns on maritime

255.
Regulation 19, Chapter V,
2.4 of the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea [hereinafter SOLAS] applies to all ships of 300 gross tonnage and
upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and
upwards not engaged on international voyages, and all passenger ships irrespective of
size. The requirement became effective for all ships by December 31, 2004.
256.
Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.
257.
Regulation 8 of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS, supra note 255, titled "Masters
discretion for ship safety and security."
258.
IMO Resolution A.917(22), Guidelines for the Onboard Operational Use of
Shipborne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), 21 (Nov. 29, 2001).
259.

See also ROBERT H. ALLEN, AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM: RESEARCH

FROM THE BRIDGE (2004), available at http://www.nautinst.org/aisdocs/research
FromBridge.doc. Captain Allen of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, U.K. found that 96% of
shipmasters polled in June 2004 responded that their AIS is on most of the time, but
77% of them are concerned with the security aspects of AIS. Also, 47% consider
switching their AIS off, and 19% definitely switch it off when passing through a known
piracy area. Id.
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trade. 260 At its seventy-ninth session in December 2004, the Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO condemned the release of AIS
data on the web and urged member states to discourage those who do
so, but to no appreciable effect. 261 Additionally, AIS can easily be
spoofed and jammed by entering false tracks into a specific area via a
laptop computer and basic handheld VHF receiver.
Therefore, while many commercial and regulatory benefits of
AIS exist, reliance on the system to provide much help in the realm of
MSO is misguided. More fruitful would be to encourage shipping
companies to install the relatively inexpensive LOJACK for ships
known as ShipLoc. 2 62 It is discrete, can provide an accurate location
to ship owners of their vessels' locations, complies with SOLAS XI-2/6
and is endorsed by the IMB. 263 It is also secure and confidential.
Most important, it can be equipped to sound an instantaneous alarm
264
simultaneously to the ship owner, IMB, and flag state authority.
D. Adding Greater Law Enforcement Trainingto VBSS Teams
In the discharge of its constabulary functions, the Navy must
think, and train, more like the Coast Guard-even as it thinks and
trains more like the SEALs. The NASSAU Strike Group was among
the first strike groups to deploy with VBSS teams trained by former
SEALs to conduct non-compliant boardings, formerly the exclusive
In their enhanced curriculum,
province of Special Forces. 265
prospective VBSS members learned the basics of long gun control and
small arms handling, day and night defensive tactics, mission
planning, shipboard team close quarters combat (CQC), and insertion
However, the training was severely
and extraction techniques.

260.
See AISLive.com, Live Ship Info, http://www.aislive.com (last visited Nov.
20, 2006).
See IMO, AIS transponders, http://www.imo.org/Legal/mainframe.asp?topic
261.
_id=754 (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
262.
See ShipLoc, About ShipLoc, http://www.shiploc.com/html/about-shiploc.
html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
263.

See 2005 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 4, at 29.

See ShipLoc, How It Works, http://www.shiploc.com/html/how-it works.
264.
html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
265.
While a compliant boarding involves (1) a suspect vessel's full compliance
with the directions of the on-scene commander (OSC), (2) no apparent passive or active
resistance measures, and (3) no intelligence to indicate a threat, a noncompliant
boarding involves a suspect vessel that fails to comply with OSC directions and
employs "passive measures" to delay, impede, or otherwise complicate the boarding.
See Maritime Interception Operations, NTTP 3-07.11, 1.5 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter
Maritime Interception Operations]. There is no intelligence to indicate a threat in a
noncompliant boarding. Id. The most dangerous boarding is an "opposed boarding,"
which involves possible threats and the suspect vessel has demonstrated an intent to
actively oppose the boarding team, and resistance is "clearly intended to inflict harm."
Id. Piracy operations will likely fall into either of the two latter categories.
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lacking in evidence handling and crime-scene preservation. 266 LT
Robert Hainline of the VBSS team from the USS CARTER HALL
(LSD 50) described only "one small lecture" during their training on
evidentiary issues, which "raised more questions than anything
else." 267 Those questions, he further explained, could not be
answered because "the instructors weren't lawyer-types or
''268
investigators; they were ex-SEALs.
More significantly, he explained the evidence lecture was focused
on collecting evidence for intelligence purposes, not for criminal
admissibility purposes. 269 Indeed, the evidentiary sections of Naval
Tactics Techniques and Protocols (NTTP) 3-07.11, the Navy and
Coast Guard's doctrine on Maritime Interception Operations (MIO)
which is used to train VBSS teams, also concern themselves with
2 70
evidentiary issues for "maritime target development," not for court.
Either NTTP 3-07.11 needs to be revised to accommodate naval
constabulary missions, as distinct from MIO and Coast Guard-led law
enforcement operations under 14 U.S.C. § 89,271 or a new guideline
must be created for this burgeoning mission set.
Either way, more training is needed. It is no use to have VBSS
teams wait for criminal investigators, since shore-based investigators
could be a long way off and certainly cannot be at the ready on all
deployed vessels. As the IMO notes: "Law enforcement officials first
attending a scene must appreciate the importance of their role in
'2 72
gathering and passing on as quickly as possible relevant evidence.
While the WINSTON S. CHURCHILL VBSS team followed its
training and the doctrine of NTTP 3-07.11, it did not bag and tag the
three pieces of evidence it seized, nor did it conduct a crime scene

266.
See, e.g., IMO Resolution A.922(22), supra note 246,
4.1.3 (ranking the
securing of evidence third behind rescuing hostages and arresting the pirates).
267.
Interview with Robert Hainline, Lieutenant, onboard USS CARTER HALL
(Mar. 15, 2006).
268.
Id.
269.
Id.
270.
Maritime Interception Operations, supra note 265, at 5.6.3.4.
271.
See id. at 2.2.4.
The basis and mission of law enforcement operations (LEO), however, is far
different from MIO. LEO, as defined under 14 U.S.C. 89, gives the USCG
statutory authority to make inquiries, examinations, searches, seizures, and
arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has
jurisdiction for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of the
laws of the United States. MIO by warships is authorized under international
law to support international policy objectives. Navy ships carrying LEDET
support Federal law enforcement efforts, but Navy and other Department of
Defense (DOD) personnel are generally prohibited from direct involvement in
law enforcement activity, such as boarding, arrest, or seizure. Counterdrug
and alien migrant interdiction operations are examples of LEO.
272.

IMO Resolution A.922(22), supra note 246,

6.8.
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analysis of the Safina al Bisarat. At the Kenya trial, it was very
difficult to admit the AK-47, the cell phone and charger, and the
magazine clip without the proper evidence custody documents
(ECDs), which all the other evidence had. I successfully explained to
the court why the U.S. military creates ECDs, how we would not
backdate an ECD, and how the enormity of the initial operation and
the safety of everyone on the boarding team precluded such a step in
this instance. However, cases will be considerably stronger in the
future if boarding teams handle evidence the same way that trained
investigators do.
Along the same lines, the recent Kenyan trial strongly indicated
the desirability of limiting the number of U.S. naval personnel who
come into contact with evidence, thereby limiting the number of
potential witnesses in the chain. Generally, a person can only testify
to facts within his or her personal knowledge. 273 The prosecution was
able to convince the court that since the NASSAU Strike Group
"directed the entirety of the operation," the Author could establish a
solid chain merely by stating, "I and my team." That strategy worked
in this instance, keeping many people from having to make an inperson appearance. However, such may not always be the case.
Operational considerations will often determine who encounters
evidence, but operational considerations will also be impacted when
those same people are subpoenaed to distant courts. As a general
rule, therefore, the fewer people the better.
Additionally, the Kenyan trial experience highlighted the need to
devote one photographer to document the trial-bound evidence. In
Kenya, photographic evidence is apparently inadmissible without
calling the actual photographer. While not the rule in U.S. federal
courts,2 7 4 it could be the rule in other countries besides Kenya. Given
the need to limit the number of potential witnesses, the photographer
could be someone already heavily involved with the investigation, like
the ship's Security Officer or the JAG, recognizing that he or she will
likely be summoned to testify. It would also be advisable to take one
set of photographs with a traditional film camera, not a digital
camera, to forestall any claims of manipulation at trial. 275

273.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 602.
274.
See, e.g., United States v. Mojica, 746 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1984)
(affirming the admission of a photograph where the defendant did not overcome the
presumption that government officials had acted properly in taking the photograph).
275.
See, e.g., Jill Witkowski, Can Juries Really Believe What They See? New
FoundationalRequirements for the Authentication of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 267 (2002) (examining the legal system's treatment of digital images).
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E. Exploring the Q-Ship Option
Militarily, the United States could explore a tactic employed by
the British in World War I. In 2002, "pirates in the Strait of Hormuz
mistook the USNS Walter H. Diehl for a merchant vessel and
attempted to attack [it]. '' 276 As Harold Hutchison has written, this
type of encounter leads to the "possibility of using [a] 21st-century
'277
version of the 'Q-ship' to lure pirates in and to destroy them.
Assume then that the Safina al Bisarat was not manned by Indian
crewmembers but rather by U.S. Marines, who engaged the ten
suspected Somalis as they swarmed the dhow and attempted to board
by force. The Q-Ship was U.S.-flagged, and the Marines disguised
themselves as civilian mariners. This floating Trojan horse was
designed, as Hutchison would have it, to "kill off pirates," as well as
to "provide a deterrent effect (pirates would wonder if the container
ship was really just a container ship, or if it was bristling with
'278
enough firepower to blow them out of the water).
Is the Q-Ship operation as outlined above legal?
It depends. Any ship designed to look like a merchant vessel but
which springs to life with an exceptionally robust self-defense
capability would have to be very carefully designed to avoid running
afoul not only of the Law of the Sea, but of the Law of Armed Conflict
as well, even though the latter technically does not apply.
First, the mission would have to be conceived as a self-defense
operation, based upon the inherent right of self defense and the
UNCLOS authority to repress and capture pirates on the high seas. It
could not be an offensive ambush. An ambush, in which opposing
forces lie in wait, is a permissible tactic under the laws of war. 279 The
underlying target, however, has to be a legitimate one. In this
situation, there are typically no forces declared hostile-there are not
even forces, only individuals who could, or could not be, pirates. It is
only by committing an illegal act against the Q-Ship on the high seas
(e.g., approaching at high speed with guns drawn or actually firing at
the ship) that the attackers become lawful targets, and only under
the rubric of self-defense.
U.S. doctrine on self-defense, enunciated by the JCS Standing
Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces (SROE), provides that the use of
force in self-defense against armed attack, or the threat of imminent
armed attack, rests upon two elements, the first of which would

276.
Harold C. Huthison, Sea Transportation:The Pirates have Evolved, Dec. 2,
2005, available at http://www.strategypage.comlhtmw/htseamo/articles/20051202.aspx.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
J. Ashley Roach, Ruses and Perfidy: Deception During Armed Conflict, 23
U. TOL. L. REV. 395, 398 (1992).
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certainly be triggered by fast-approaching, gun-pointing pirates on
the high seas:
(1.) Necessity-The requirement that a use of force be in response to a
hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.
(2.) Proportionality-The requirement that the use of force be in all
circumstances limited in intensity, duration, and scope to that which is
reasonably required to counter the attack or threat of attack and to
280
ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces.

In other words, the Q-Ship would be a bait ship. Once
individuals reveal themselves as international criminals by going
after the bait, they have positively identified themselves as hostis
humani generi and can be captured or engaged as necessary.
But what of the second element? Putting aside the obvious
dangers to those on the bait ship, what measure of force may be used
against the attackers? Can the Q-Ship ruse be used to "kill off
pirates"?
No. The ruse must be designed to flush out pirates in order to
capture them. There is no provision in international law authorizing
the killing of pirates except in self-defense. That said, the very
nature of the Q-Ship operation will likely mean death, or at least
serious injury, for some of the pirates. If an attacker revealed himself
as such within weapons-release range of the Q-Ship, those Marines
on board would have to counter the threat, and deadly force is
proportional to deadly force. The fact that the Marines will have
better aim and better equipment is of no moment-if you illegally
bring a knife to a gunfight, you do so at your own peril.
That said, the force the Marines employ could only extend to that
necessary to neutralize the threat against them, as determined by the
Q-Ship commander. While force employed in self-defense can never
be used with the view of inflicting punishment for acts previously
committed, since the necessity element under the SROE and Caroline
Case would not be met, it is important to point out that even a fleeing
skiff could pose a very real threat until it is well out of their weaponsrelease range. However, pursuing a vessel solely for the purposes of
remaining in its weapons-release range cannot justify continued
application of lethal force in "self-defense."

280.

CHAIRMAN

OF THE

JOINT CHIEFS

OF

STAFF,

INSTRUCTION

3121.01A,

STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT T 5f. The classic international law formulation of
the doctrine of self-defense derives from U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster's 1841
articulation to the British government in the Caroline case, requiring that a
government show a "necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means, and no moment of deliberation." Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence
Under InternationalLaw, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 69, n.133 (2003) (quoting Letter of
Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS,
1840-1841 1137-38 (1857)).
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Pursuing the vessel to capture pirates, of course, would keep the
Q-Ship within range, and thus necessitate return-fire if the fleeing
pirates continued to exhibit hostile intent. But under international
law, a Q-Ship cannot capture pirates; only a "clearly marked" warship
can. 281 According to UNCLOS, one of the features of a warship is one
"bearing the external markings distinguishing such ships of its
nationality." 28 2 In fact, UNCLOS Article 107 specifically strengthened
the discernability requirement, adding the phrase "clearly marked
and identifiable" to the Geneva Convention's far leaner
formulation. 28 3 As Bernard H. Oxman explains, what is "too rarely
understood" about the law of piracy is that "most of its rules are
designed to refine and circumscribe the universal enforcement and
adjudicative jurisdiction it confers. '28 4 The object is to "create just
enough universal jurisdiction to respond to the practical problem
posed by murder and mayhem on the high seas, but not so much as to
threaten random violence or unwarranted interference with freedom
of navigation and the liberty interests associated with that
freedom. '28 5 UNCLOS Article 106, for example, explicitly provides
for "R]iability for seizure without adequate grounds. ' 28 6 A covert QShip shark would run afoul of UNCLOS's carefully prescribed
enforcement zone.
However, were it not for an 1819 U.S. Statute, that would be the
end of the story. According to Title 33, Section 383 of the U.S. Code,
merchant vessels and other non-public vessels are permitted to
"subdue and capture" pirates. 287 Additionally, under U.S. law, if self-

281.
See UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 107 ("A seizure on account of piracy
may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that
effect.").
282.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 29.
283.
High Seas Convention, supra note 26, at art. 21 ("A seizure on account of
piracy may only be carried out by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or
aircraft on government service authorized to that effect."). If this article were to trump
UNCLOS Article 107, the Q-Ship would of course be "on government service authorized
to that effect."
284.
Bernard H. Oxman, Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 399, 403 (1997).
285.
Id.
286.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art.106.
287.
33 U.S.C. § 383 (2000).
The commander and crew of any merchant vessel of the United States, owned
wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, may oppose and defend against any
aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, which shall be attempted
upon such vessel, or upon any other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew
of any armed vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some nation
in amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the same; and
may also retake any vessel so owned which may have been captured by the
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defense permits proportional lethal responses, would not the greater
power include the lesser?
In U.S. courts, explicit U.S. law tends to trump customary
international law. 288 Thus, there is a choice of law issue. According
to the Second Circuit in United States v. Yousef:
It has long been established that customary international law is part of
the law of the United States to the limited extent that "where there is
no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
289

nations."

In that case, there was a controlling legislative act. Yousef limited
the Supreme Court's well-known directive that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains," to only those cases where no
ambiguity
exists:
"If a
statute
makes plain
Congress's
intent ...

,

then Article III courts . . . must enforce the intent of

Congress irrespective of whether the statute conforms to customary
international law. 2 90
However, U.S. piracy statutes incorporate the law of nations, and
it is at least arguable that as the law of nations changes, so too must
U.S. municipal law. Chapter 7 of U.S. Code Title 33, under which §
383 falls, entitled "Regulations for the Suppression of Piracy," and
pursuant to Title 18 §1651, piracy is "defined by the law of
nations." 29 1 After comparing Congress's incorporation by reference of
the law of nations for piracy with the "law of war" for military
commission jurisdiction in Ex Parte Quirin, the Supreme Court
alluded to the organic nature of the reference: "Congress had the
choice of crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every
offense against the law of war, or of adopting the system of common
law applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and

commander or crew of any such armed vessel, and send the same into any port
of the United States." (emphasis added).
288.
See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
289.
Id. at 92 (citing In re The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)); see
also Oliva v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2005) (referring to In
re The Paquete Habana and Yousef to demonstrate the limited circumstances under
which it is appropriate for the United States to resort to customary international law);
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir.1986) (noting that "public
international law is controlling only" in the absence of controlling positive law or
judicial precedent).
290.
Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86, 93 (citations omitted); see also Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that
"under domestic law, statutes supersede customary international law" and "no
enactment of Congress can be challenged on the ground that it violates customary
international law").
291.
33 U.S.C. § 383; 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
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deemed applicable by the courts. ' 292 As the Court concluded, "It
293
chose the latter course.
Even assuming arguendo that §1651 only incorporates UNCLOS
Article 101, not the enforcement provision of Article 107 and the
limiting factor of Article 106, the U.S. law nevertheless indicates an
294
attempt to incorporate international law, not preempt it.
In an extremely important case on the role of international law
in domestic jurisprudence, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain suggested that there may be a fill-in-the blank quality to
piracy. 295 The Court held that a "narrow set" of international law
violations are directly actionable under the otherwise purely
jurisdictional Alien-Tort Statute (ATS) enacted by the First
Congress. 29 6 Through historical analysis, the Court concluded that
Congress passed the ATS assuming it could be used without further
legislation to hear a "very limited set of claims" alleging violations of
the specific law of nations norms that were also part of common law,
297
including piracy.
Sosa acknowledged that Congress may "at any time" preclude
the application of customary international law to a particular
situation "by treaties or statutes that occupy the field," but it added
that "nothing Congress has done is a reason for us to shut the door on
international law." 298 Quite the opposite appears true in the specific
case of piracy after Sosa-the door to international law appears open.
Thus, since the early U.S. law of piracy incorporates the "law of
nations," it is possible that any pirates captured by the Q-Ship itself
could be set free by U.S. courts citing customary international law
and the 1958 High Seas Convention, to which the United States is a
party. Put another way, the adage "it is easier to seek forgiveness
than ask permission," does not often apply in law. Actually using the
Q-Ship to capture the pirates, as opposed to stopping them in the
water for ultimate capture by a warship over the horizon, risks
subverting successful prosecution.
Besides, with universality
allowing prosecution in any nation, the risk of having no domestic law
to potentially trump Article 107 is even greater.
Three other points on the legality of a Q-Ship operation are
worth mentioning.
Even though Geneva Protocol 1299 and the

292.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1942).
293.
Id.
294.
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 164-80 (1820)
(Livingston, J., dissenting) (discussing the specificity with which the law of nations
defined piracy).
295.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
296.
Id. at 715.
297.
Id. at 720.
298.
Id. at 731.
299.
Supra note 244.
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customary law of naval warfare do not apply to constabulary
functions, it is important to nevertheless honor the following rules for
all the reasons stated above. First, flying false colors is still a
permissible ruse under customary international law, but the correct
flag should be raised at the moment of engagement. 30 0 Second, the QShip should avoid "sweetening the trap" by flying a white flag,
otherwise feigning surrender, or feigning distress, all of which are
considered perfidy. 301
Third, donning regular civilian attire
threatens the civilian-combatant distinction 30 2 and should be avoided
in favor of a "discrete" uniform with a subdued flag.
Ultimately, the Q-Ship is an available arrow in the quiver of
military responses on the high seas, so long as it is carefully designed
to accord with international law, and so long as it does not progress
too far along the Y-axis to threaten coalition participation and
increase the opportunities for terrorism. Making pirates fear that
their next victim may be heavily armed Marines or SEALs will
certainly increase the deterrence value as Hutchinson states. 303
However, whatever slight advantages are gained by not fully abiding
by international law, for example, are not worth the costs, both to the

300.

See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 509 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1952).

The ruse which is of most practical importance in naval warfare is the use of
the false flag. It now seems to be fairly well established by the custom of the
sea that a ship is justified in wearing false colours for the purpose of deceiving
the enemy, provided that she goes into action under her true colors. . . . It is
equally permissible for a warship to disguise her outward appearance in other
ways and even to pose as a merchant ship, provided that she hoists the naval
ensign before opening fire. Merchant vessels themselves are also at liberty to
deceive enemy cruisers in this way.
H. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 115-16 (1959) (citing 1 CORBETT, NAVAL
OPERATIONS 350 (1920)).

301.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 244, arts. 37(1)(a)-(b), 38(1); see also
OPPENHEIM, supra note 300, at 342; San Remo Manual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea,
111, June 12, 1994, available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57JMSU#5. Perfidy was first defined in
treaty law by Geneva Protocol I Article 37(1): "Acts inviting the confidence of an
adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection
under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray
that confidence, shall constitute perfidy."
302.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 244, at art. 37(1)(c). Since civilians are not
lawful objects of attack as such in armed conflict, it follows that disguising combatants
in civilian clothing in order to commit hostilities constitutes perfidy. See Geneva
Protocol I, supra note 244, at art. 48 ("In order to ensure respect for and protection of
the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.").
303.
This is especially true if the fact of a lurking Q-Ship is publicized by the
series of handbills normally distributed in the course of Maritime Security Operations.
See infra Part III.G (discussing Information Operations).
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pending prosecution and to the United States' long-term strategic
interests.
F. Limited Authorization for Entry Within Twelve NauticalMiles of
Somalia
A similar cost-benefit analysis militates in favor of only a limited
authorization for surface entry within twelve nautical miles of the
Somali coast. Purposefully entering the maritime "Nebraska" of
Malaysia without its permission would certainly cause a serious
international incident. The United States, however, can enter within
twelve nautical miles of Somalia with relative direct impunity, and it
is arguably legally entitled to do so. However, there are broader
prosecutorial implications, as well as diplomatic and strategic
consequences, that caution against an overt policy of blanket entry.
If Somalia is truly a failed state, with no functioning
government, 30 4 it would appear to follow that Somalis cannot have a
Only a state can have a territorial sea under
territorial sea.
UNCLOS, a treaty among contracting states. The Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States defines a
"state" as an "entity that has a defined territory, and a permanent
population, under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities."30 5 Somalia has not had an effective government
for a long time, and it is too early to tell whether the Ethiopian
assistance to the TFG will be sufficient. 30 6 Somalia itself admits to
four internal secessions and claims that three-fourths of its 1990
territory has been "gripped by civil war at some point up until this
date." 30 7 Up until very recently, Islamists opposed to the TFG
controlled Mogadishu and large swaths of Somali territory. They also
would likely have taken Baidoa, the seat of Somalia's transitional
government, had it not been for outside military assistance. 308
Finally, on January 13, 2007, the Somali Parliament declared a state
3
of emergency due to the growing insurgency. 09

304.

See Background Note: Somalia, supra note 69.

305.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 201 (emphasis added).
306.
Jonathan Stevenson, A Fleeting Victory in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2007.
Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations, Country Facts,
307.
http://un.cti.depaul.edu/cgi-bispider.py?-request=l&country-Somalia&language=English
(last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Trio to Rise from Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
308.
2007.
Somalia Declares a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007.
309.
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The fact that an entity named Somalia became a party to
UNCLOS on July 24, 1989,310 and that that entity laid claim to an
excessive 200 nautical mile territorial seas in 1972, 311 is of no
moment because that entity has legally ceased to exist. Additionally,
the transitional government has yet to file a notification of
succession.
One point should be made clear about this argument-it does not
turn on whether the United States or any other nation likes or
approves of a government. The argument turns simply on objective
observations of whether a government, and thus a country, exists.
But even if it were a functioning state, it is up to that state to
affirmatively declare its territorial waters: "Every State has the right
to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in
accordance with this Convention." 312 UNCLOS empowers the
signatory states, but it does not create a twelve nautical mile default
provision, nor does it create an affirmative duty on states to establish
territorial seas. Accordingly, UNCLOS also does not create an
automatic obligation on other states to stay beyond twelve nautical
miles of any coastal nation. UNCLOS only provides that coastal
nations may lawfully extend the breadth of claimed territorial seas
up to twelve nautical miles. 3 13 No such declaration has been made by
the post-1991 transitional governments.
Additionally, UNCLOS and the Territorial Sea Convention grant
a right of innocent passage through territorial seas-they do not
prohibit other types of entry. 314 Just as espionage during armed
conflict is not a violation of international law-and spies are not
entitled to prisoner-of-war treatment 315 -violations
of innocent

310.
U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists
of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related
Agreements
as
at
02
November
2006,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
conventionagreements/convention agreements.htm (follow "Chronological list of
ratifications/accessions/successions" hyperlink).
311.
Law No. 37 on the Territorial Seas and Ports, of 10 September 1972, art. 1,
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/
SOM_1972_Law.pdf; see also TABLE OF CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION (AS AT 30

JUNE 2006), available at http://www.un.org/Deptslos/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/claims_2005.pdf [hereinafter TABLE OF CLAIMS] (providing a review of all
claims to the U.N. for maritime jurisdiction).
312.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 3 (emphasis added).
313.
In fact, a number of states claim less than twelve nautical miles for their
territorial seas, including Jordan, Singapore, Palau, Norway, Dominican Republic,
Greece, and Turkey (though only in the Aegean Sea). See TABLE OF CLAIMS, supra note
311.

314.
UNCLOS, supra note 25, at arts. 17-18; Territorial Sea Convention, supra
note 64, at arts. 14.1-.2.
315.
Hague Regulation Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art.
30, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227.
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passage are only offences under domestic law. Coastal states, through
municipal legislation or practice, must affirmatively bar non-innocent
passage through their waters, 316 which Somalia has not done.
Thus, for both definitional purposes under UNCLOS Article 101
and universal enforcement purposes under UNCLOS Article 105, the
waters off Somalia could constitute the "high seas," or at least "any
other place outside the jurisdiction of any State." Under this
argument, authorization to enter Somalia's putative seas would be
legally sound.
However, there are strong policy arguments against such a tack.
It is important to re-emphasize that recognition of statehood is a
political decision made by individual nations, 317 and that prosecution
is in the hands of foreign judges who possesses their own
interpretations of political questions and international law. Somalia,
after all, is still listed as a Member of the United Nations, 318 and
nations around the world have entered into formal debates over
whether to recognize Somalia, Somaliland, or both. 319 In May 2006,
the Transitional Parliament was formed 320 and began to assert itself
within Somalia. In March 2006, the European Union resolved to
"enhance and broaden its relations with Somalia," 321 while the IMO
specifically mentions that it is "respecting fully the sovereignty,
sovereign rights, jurisdiction and territorial integrity of Somalia and
the relevant provisions of international law, in particular
In Kenya, the magistrate entertained, though
UNCLOS." 322
ultimately rejected, a motion to dismiss based on Somalia's claimed
200 nautical mile territorial sea. 32 3 Had the attack occurred less

316.
Under customary international law, the appropriate remedy is to first
"inform the ship of the reason why [the coastal nation] questions the innocence of the
passage, and [to] provide the ship an opportunity to clarify its intentions or correct its
conduct in a reasonably short period of time." Uniform Interpretation of Rules of
4, Sept. 23, 1989,
International Law Governing Innocent Passage, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
reprinted in 89 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Nov. 1989, at 26.
317.
See discussion supra Part 2.B.
318.
United Nations, List of Member States, http://www.un.org/Overview/
unmember.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
The British ParliamentDebate on Somaliland, SOMALILAND NET, Feb. 4,
319.
2005, http://www.somalilandnet.com/somalilandnews/somaliland/2002/12343.shtml.
320.
Somalia Declares a Crisis, supra note 309.
321.
Council conclusions on Somalia (adopted as an A-item): 2718th GENERAL
AFFAIRS Council meeting, Brussels, 20 March 2006), RELIEFWEB, Mar. 20, 2006,
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-6N3JBE?OpenDocument.
322.
1MO Resolution A.979(24), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in
Waters off the Coast of Somalia, at 4 (Nov. 23, 2005).
323.
See Piracy Suspects Challenge Court, NEWS 24.COM, Feb. 6, 2006,
http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447-1875997,00.html (reporting
that the piracy suspects moved to dismiss the charges because the Kenyan court had
no jurisdiction over the matter); see also Somali PiratesFace Death Penalty in Kenya,
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than twelve nautical miles out to sea, it would have been interesting
to see what she would have held.
The United States' view on Somalia vis-A-vis international law
may not accord with the views of other prosecuting nations,
restricting the United States' ability to find a cooperating third-party
state to prosecute. Even if the United States could forum shop for the
state, it could not forum shop for the judge. 324 On one level, the
uncertainty of successful prosecution may outweigh the benefits of
entry to capture those responsible for piratical acts occurring within
twelve nautical miles of Somalia.
It is important to note at this point that a piratical act on the
high seas, however, does not magically transform itself into maritime
crime just because the pirates flee into territorial waters. Once the
act qualifies as piracy under UNCLOS 101, coalition navies should
feel free, both legally and politically, to pursue the pirates within
twelve nautical miles of Somalia since universal jurisdiction will still
attach. Normally the United States may pursue fleeing pirates into
any nation's territorial waters so long as it makes all efforts to obtain
prior consent from the coastal state, break off the chase if later
instructed to do so, and afford the coastal state the first right of
prosecution. 325 There is no real way for Somalia to grant or deny
permission at this point. The United States may also pursue pirates
into internationally recognized straits without permission, so long as
the pursuit is continuous and expeditious and does not unduly
326
interfere with the transit rights of others.
Thus, in addition to hot pursuit, the United States should only
conduct selective and limited incursions into Somalia's coastal waters
for intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE) and deterrence
operations. The benefits of a fuller maritime picture and the removal
of any perceived twelve nautical mile safe haven outweigh the
minimal dangers to personnel and risks to prosecution. 327 As will be
discussed further below, Somalia benefits as much as the
international shipping community does in keeping its waters free
from piracy.

CNN.com, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006WORLD/africa/10/26/somali.
kenya.pirates.ap.
324.
Of course, the United States could also look to the possibility of prosecution
based on one of the other four grounds of jurisdiction under customary international
law. See discussion supra note 52.
325.

66,

COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note

3.5.3.2.
326.
Id.
327.
It is doubtful that a court would strain itself to develop a "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine for intelligence leading to capture derived from a non-innocent
passage through what the court would have to determine are Somalia's legitimate
territorial waters.
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But an overt and routine policy of entry carries serious
diplomatic and strategic costs. Does the United States want to appear
as if it is unilaterally exerting its military presence in yet another
poor, Islamic country? Does it want to give regular Somalis possible
grounds to resent the United States, thereby helping to kindle an
anti-American fire that export-oriented terrorists could exploit?
Domestically, does the United States want to take on yet another role
as the global police force, especially in Somalia, a nation for which
such a role already failed so publicly?
Of course, broad coalition agreement and participation, as well
as a United Nations Security Council Resolution specifying multilateral entry within twelve nautical miles of Somalia, could alleviate
much of this concern. The African Union has already resolved to send
328
troops this past year.
Express Somali permission would also help-although only in a
sense. On April 17, 2006, the BBC reported that the Somali Prime
Minister, Ali Mohammed Ghedi, told ministers that he had worked
out a deal with the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya to include granting
permission for U.S. patrols in Somali waters. 329 Again, a U.S. or
coalitional presence is very much in Somalia's maritime interests.
However, the United States should be mindful of the implications
involved in accepting that permission, lest the United States de facto
recognize Somalia as a state, as well as effectively acknowledge its
claim to territorial waters. Political recognition has far-reaching
consequences that need to be carefully evaluated.
Additionally, any arguably piratical acts within those
acknowledged Somali waters would then become mere maritime
crime. Universal jurisdiction would not attach, and the United States
would be forced to turn over the suspects to Somalia (however that
330
could be safely accomplished) or to the victim-ship's flag state.
Having Somalia and the world see U.S. efforts for what they
are-an attempt to assist in maintaining order over the oceans-is
valuable. But the U.S. Navy was justified in denying that any such
agreement was made. It should, however, always take a diplomatic
tack.3 31 As discussed immediately below, words often matter as much
as might.

328.
Daniel Flynn, African Union Agrees Peace Mission for Somalia, Reuters,
July 2, 2006, available at http://www.benadir-watch.com/2006%2ONews/0702AU
agrees-peace mission to Som.pdf.
329.
Tackle Somali Pirates,supra note 71.
330.
Jurisdiction under the passive personality principle could also attach via
any of the victims.
331.
See U.S. Navy Denies Deal to Battle Somali Piracy, REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2006
(revealing that although the Somali Prime Minister asked for help from the United
States, a spokesman for the U.S. navy denied any agreement had been made).

72

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:'1

G. The Information Operations Campaign
While often overlooked, the timely design and dissemination of
information is critical to effective maritime security operations, as it
is to the war on terrorism as a whole.
First, 1O assists in maximizing deterrence by increasing the
perceived probability that illicit actions will be caught and punished.
In fact, given the desperate state of Somalia the financial incentives
for piracy, and the relative security of sea-borne activities as
compared to land-based activities, increasing the perceived
probability of capture will likely have more of a deterrent effect than
would increasing the severity of the penalties. 33 2 If the United States
and its coalition patrol the vast waters off Somalia, but those efforts
are not widely known, deterrence suffers. Furthermore, even if the
United States and its coalition partners cannot be in all places at all
times, it can create the appearance of greater presence by handing
out leaflets and broadcasting over the radio. The substance of that
communication would be to announce coalition presence and its
intent to vigorously repress piracy. It could also announce the
presence of a Q-Ship, while reassuring legitimate mariners.
Second, 1O can spread the message that upholding the rule of
law is beneficial to all, especially to Somalis. After all, U.N. World
Food shipments will enter safely, more cargo will enter Somali ports,
and more trade will occur. Additionally, an 10 campaign that
stresses U.S. resolve to enforce the mutually beneficial rule of law
over the seas will help educate countries like Somalia on the rule of
law in general and the value of adhering to it. As President Bush has
said: "Developed nations have a duty not only to share [their] wealth,
but also to encourage sources that produce wealth: economic freedom,
political liberty, the rule of law and human rights. ''333 The message
can be summed up as: "Your rights and obligations are our rights and
obligations, for the law of the sea applies equally to all of us who take
to the seas-adhering to the rules benefits you just as it does the rest
of the world." 334 A finely tuned 1O campaign along similar, selfinterested lines would also benefit the coastal nations of the Straits of
Malacca.

332.
See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 6 (Albert J.Reiss,
Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth, eds., 1993) (proposing that an increase in the prison population
has not caused a reduction in the level of violent crime); see also Jeffrey Grogger,
Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 335 (1991) (discussing
conflicting findings concerning the connections between economic factors and crime).
President George W. Bush, Remarks at the International Conference on
333.
Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico (Mar. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/usaE.htm.
334.
It is not necessary to discuss the fine points of Somalia's statehood in an
information operations campaign.
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But most important, a maritime security 10 campaign can prove
invaluable in the overall war on terror. As World War I, World War
II, and the Cold War, respectively, pitted monarchism, fascism, and
communism against democracy, the current war against terror has
both military and ideological components. As the Report of the 9/11
Commission appropriately advised, in our battle against "a radical
ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in part by al
Qaeda" we need to "define what the message is, what it stands
'3 35
for... [and] offer an example of moral leadership in the world.
Naval constabulary missions to enforce the rule of law over the sea
offer the United States that opportunity. As the 9/11 Commission
described: "To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing
to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and
its friends have an advantage-we can offer these parents a vision
that might give their children a better future.' '3 36 It is truly amazing
how little it takes to affect the unexposed, to vaccinate them against
radical Islamic pathogens. The Somalis that were captured in
January 2006, detained, and delivered for prosecution emerged (to
the Author's astonishment) with remarkable respect for the firm
fairness of the United States. The United States should seize upon
this truth and seek to gain adherents. The alternative is much worse:
"If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the
'337
Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.
But the encounter with the ten suspected pirates indicates that
the United States is not doing all that it can to ensure that its vision
reaches the widest possible audience. After the ten Somalis were
caught, word of their excellent treatment on NASSAU spread, albeit
reluctantly, among African papers. 338 There was no Navy press
release. The NASSAU's refueling, replenishing, and escorting of the
freed Safina al Bisarat also received no Navy press attention. An
underway refueling is a sight to behold, especially between an
enormous naval vessel and a comparatively tiny dhow, to say nothing
of the tens of thousands of dollars that the U.S. Navy spent in freeing
it. Such humanitarian efforts are not as exciting as firing warning
shots, but they are nonetheless important.
The Commander of the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa has the
right idea. "We are trying to dry up the recruiting pool for Al Qaeda
by showing people the way ahead," Major General Timothy Ghormley
explained to the Christian Science Monitor as he pointed his
eyeglasses at recent pictures of African children celebrating gushing

335.

THE 9/11 COMM'N, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 363, 376 (2004).
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water from a new well that his troops built. 339 "Look at those kids.
They're gonna remember this. In 25 years they'll say, 'I remember
340
the West-they were good."'
Maritime Security Operations are just one facet of the overall
global strategy. Publicly doing good, while firmly enforcing the law,
counters Al Qaeda propaganda in Africa and in other Muslim nations
like Indonesia. As Fareed Zakaria wisely pointed out right after the
September 11th attacks: "During the cold war the West employed
myriad ideological strategies to discredit the appeal of communism,
make democracy seem attractive and promote open societies. We will
34 1
have to do something on that scale to win this cultural struggle."
Such a strategy also helps recruit other nations to join Western
security coalitions.
The stakes in this struggle are high. A 2004 Zogby International
poll indicates that fewer than 10% of those surveyed in Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates approved of U.S. policy on Arabs, Iraq, or the
Palestinians. 342 When asked to indicate their "first thought" about
the United States, the most common response was "unfair foreign
policy." 343 As ill-informed as these opinions are, the fact remains that
those are widely-held opinions, thus indicating that the United States
is obviously losing the information war.
"If we don't succeed, Somalia will become a home to Islamic
extremists, to terrorists," Somalia's President Abdullahi Yusuf
stated. 344 However, this former warlord also expressed that his own
goal was to "establish Islamic government in Somalia, then other
countries.... [I]f it's possible to handle it by peaceful means we'll do
it that way. . . . If not, we'll do it the jihadi way." 345 The Black
Plague spread among poverty and ignorance; so too does terrorism.

IV. REGIONAL PROPOSALS
Today's strategic landscape dictates that U.S. naval orientation
should be less about sinking navies than about building navies.
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340.
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341.
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342.
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343.
344.
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While the sun may never set on U.S. naval might, the United States
still cannot physically and legally defend the vast waterways of the
world against asymmetric piratical and terrorist threats by itself. As
the National Strategy for Maritime Security has articulated:
"Security of the maritime domain can be accomplished only by
seamlessly employing all instruments of national power in a fully
coordinated manner in concert with other nation-states consistent
346
with international law."
While the United States may at times scoff at multilateralism
and decry the apparent strictures of international law, regular
maritime security operations will simply not succeed through
unilateral actions alone. Furthermore, any attempts to do so not only
undercut maritime security, but hamstring other military, political,
and diplomatic efforts around the world as well. Fortunately, the
reverse is also true. Greater multilateral involvement in this one
realm helps enlist followers for the United States' leadership
endeavors in others.
The situation is ripe for multilateral efforts with U.S. leadership.
Economic incentives, for example, are well aligned. As discussed,
347
global piracy already costs transport vessels $13-15 billion a year.
With maritime agencies warning that piracy along the coast of
southern Somalia to Kenya is increasing, local ports like Mombasa
are also feeling the pinch. 348 "The World Food Program has been
forced to suspend shipments of aid to war- and drought-ravaged
Somalia after two consignments were hijacked. ' 34 9 The Joint War
Committee (JWC) of Lloyd's Market Association declared Somalia
and the Straits a "high risk zone," enabling underwriters to charge
extra premiums to vessels traversing those waters. 350 Finally, if the
Straits of Malacca were closed down by a maritime terrorist attack, or
even significant threat thereof, almost half the world's ocean-going
vessels would have to sail further, increasing freight rates, forcing up
shipbuilding costs, and jolting economies around the world, to say
nothing of the devastating financial, humanitarian, and economic
35 1
costs if the terrorist strike were successful.
The United States is well poised to provide what regional powers
cannot, but that is where interests critically diverge. While Malaysia

346.
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347.
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and Indonesia, for example, are happy to receive U.S. resources, they
are loathe to permit direct U.S. military presence in the Straits. "We
may need a thousand ships, but not the Americans.... These are our
straits." 352 The United States can, however, help assuage their
sovereignty suspicions and concerns by diminishing its naval
footprint, while at the same time maximizing its effect.
A. Regional Security Arrangements with Direct U.S. Participation
The United States should certainly do what it can to help
promote and support the essential regional cooperation in anti-piracy
and anti-terrorism. Since the turn of the most recent century, the
East Asian nations have increasingly come together to figure out
regional solutions to their maritime problems. In November 2002, for
example, the Joint Declaration of ASEAN (the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) and China on Cooperation in the Field of
Non-Traditional Security Issues was adopted. 353
The Joint
Declaration specifically included among its priorities sea piracy and
354
armed robbery at sea.
One year later, the ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on
Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security
was issued on June 17, 2003 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia during the
Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 355 The Statement recognized
that effective anti-piracy and anti-terrorism efforts require "regional
maritime security strategies and multilateral cooperation in their
implementation." 356 The ARF nations resolved to undertake an
exchange of information and to consider and discuss IMB proposals
on prescribed traffic lanes for large supertankers with coastguard or
naval escort, provisions of technical assistance, and capacity-building
infrastructure for countries that need help. 357 They also committed
themselves to "endorse the ongoing efforts to establish a legal

352.
Strait Talks on Oil Tanker Terror Fear, supra note 87; see also Keyuan,
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(discussing Malaysia's perspective).
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framework for regional cooperation to combat piracy and armedrobberies against ships." 358 The ARF countries, Indonesia and
Malaysia included, also expressed their desire to "endeavour to
'359
achieve effective implementation.
November 2004 witnessed the conclusion of the Japanese-led
Regional Co-Operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP).360 ReCAAP provides for the
Information Sharing Centre (ISC) for facilitating the exchange of
piracy-related information. 361 Singapore, Japan, Laos, Cambodia,
Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea have all ratified the
Agreement, while key nations like India, Malaysia, and Thailand
have signed onto the accord but have not ratified it. 3 62 Three more
participating states will need to ratify before ReCAAP can enter into
36 3
force.
In 2005 Sana'a, Yemen hosted the first sub-regional meeting to
364
discuss anti-piracy efforts in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden areas.
Kenya's Ministry of Transportation hosted a piracy conference as well
in February 2006.365 The Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore:
Enhancing
Safety, Security and
Environmental
Protection, held in Jakarta, Indonesia in September 2005 also
366
addressed the issues of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
According to the IMO, further initiatives under this program were
scheduled "for the Caribbean, South Asia, Asia Pacific, and West and
'
Central Africa in early 2006. 367
Militarily, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have launched
coordinated surface offensives "against piracy and terrorism on the
high seas" starting in July 2004.368 Indonesia's mobilization of four
warships and two maritime patrol aircraft to recover a hijacked
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Singaporean tug in December 2004 highlights the benefits of those
coordinated surface offensives. 369 However, it is important to note
that these are only coordinated patrols, not joint patrols, which would
Trilateral
permit entry into one another's territorial seas.
coordinated air patrols ("eyes in the sky") began in 2005 among the
littoral states with Thailand as an observer. 3 70 In February 2006,
"Malaysia's armed forces chief . . . said [that] Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Singapore would sign a pact in Indonesia's Batam Island . . . on
standard operating procedures" for "joint air patrols."' 371 While aerial
patrols can "fly for up to three nautical miles inside the territorial
waters of participating states," the sea patrols still do not allow any
372
nation to transgress into any other nation's territorial waters.
Current efforts, however, have proved sufficiently successful to cause
373
Lloyd's to drop the Straits from its high risk list as of August 2006.
Since Admiral Thomas Fargo, then head of U.S. Pacific
Command, announced his intention for a Regional Maritime Security
Initiative, the United States has wisely sought to involve itself
directly, or indirectly, in these patrols. 374 While misreporting of
Admiral Fargo's plans led to great skepticism within Malaysia and
Indonesia, his successor, Admiral William J. Fallon, has persevered,
albeit cautiously. In March 2006 he flew to Jakarta in order to
"solidify our relationship and to see where we go from here. '375 In
Malaysia, he hinted towards providing direct resources to the
coordinated air patrols. 376 Already under his watch, U.S. SEALs
have trained Indonesian maritime forces for anti-piracy and antimaritime terrorism, 377 and Admiral Fallon is not only encouraging a
"rapid, concerted infusion of assistance" to the Indonesian military,

369.
See Bradford, supra note 84.
See Catherine Zara Raymond, Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues
370.
and Responses, 4 HARV. ASIA Q. (2005), available at http://www.asiaquarterly.com/
index2.php?option=com.content&dopdf=l&id=30;

see also INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC

STUDIES, Sky Eye Opens: Asean Nations Join Forces to Patrol Malacca Straits by Air,
9,
2005,
http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverageSept.
2005/september-2005/sky-eye-opens-asean-nations-join-forces.
371.
US, Japan to Help Malaysia Boost Strait Security, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2006.
Raymond, supra note 370.
372.
373.
See generally Jonathan Gardner, Strait of Malacca off High Risk List, Bus.
INS., Aug. 14, 2006.
374.
The text of Admiral Fargo's March 31, 2004 testimony before the House
at http://www.house.govlhasc
Armed
Services Committee can be found
openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-03-3 lfargo.html.
375.
Richard Halloran, Admiral Visits a Front Line in Anti-Terror War,
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 5, 2006, available at http://myadvertiser.com/article/
2006[Mar/05/op/FP603050307.html.
US, Japan to Help Malaysia Boost Strait Security, supra note 371.
376.
377.
U.S. Navy SEALs in Indonesia Anti-Terrorism Drill, REUTERS, May 9,
2005.

20071

A TTA WING OPTIMA L DETERRENCE A T SEA

but has already earmarked $1million in Foreign Military Financing
378
to support Indonesia's maritime security infrastructure.
"For the recalcitrants-organized
gangs
and
die-hard
independence fighters-international
assistance in developing
indigenous patrols in Southeast Asian nations would enhance
regional security and minimize the sensitive presence of foreign naval
vessels." 379 By strengthening the naval and coast guard forces, there
is also less of a chance that the military resources would be used
toward any repression of human rights. However, the United States
should press for a physical presence in these patrols, both because it
brings the most force to bear, and because it has a tremendous
amount at stake. Sole reliance on other nations would be misplaced.
Officers directly involved in the trilateral patrols state privately that
380
those patrols are often matters more of "show" than of real utility.
The United States can obtain a more direct presence by attaining a
politically palatable, but still militarily powerful, presence.
Understanding that sovereignty concerns are those nations' first
priority, the United States should look to re-tool its MSO task forces
to achieve what Bruce Stubbs of the Heritage Foundation calls
"acceptable presence."'38 ' Large, gray U.S. Navy warships, designed
for high intensity war against major opponents, are often "too
menacing" for maritime security operations in "regions sensitive to
sovereign rights. '38 2 They may not always be the "most politically
acceptable means for duty against maritime criminals and
terrorists." 38 3 Moreover, large, gray U.S. warships are targets, as
was seen in Yemen and more recently in Jordan. Building up a
regular presence rightfully concerns some officials lest U.S. patrols
38 4
make their country less secure by attracting more terrorists.
Finally, as was demonstrated numerous times throughout this
Article, typical naval warships are not primarily designed for
constabulary missions. While they have proven that they can conduct
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effective MSO, it does not follow that they are the most efficient and
most cost-effective vehicles to do so.
What is needed may be smaller, faster craft equipped with
Special Forces or certified Marine units operating in conjunction with
a larger deck over the horizon beyond territorial seas.3 85 These craft
will not only be highly effective operationally and relatively
inexpensive, but they will also be politically subtle. Furthermore,
they will lack the full complement of intelligence collection equipment
that causes trepidation among the coastal nations.
What about the DD(X), the Navy's future multi-mission surface
combatant? Weighing in at 14,000 tons, the DD(X), according to its
program manager in the Program Executive Office for Ships and its
requirements officer in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, is
an:
advanced, expeditionary combatant for a new age of naval
warfare ... combining revolutionary land-attack capability with the
ability to protect itself in all environments, especially in the littorals. It
will deliver both high-volume, precision surface fires and pinpoint
Tomahawk strikes. In addition, DD(X) will dominate the battle space
like no other surface combatant with dual-band, active-array radar and
38 6
a fully integrated undersea warfare system.

Would Indonesia or Malaysia really want this shark less than two
miles from their shores? What about a flotilla of such beasts,
however sleek their design?
While certainly the answer to many of the Navy's needs, the
DD(X), a warship promising to "destroy more targets, at greater
'38 7
will
ranges, with fewer munitions than any warship in history,
likely not be opening any doors to joint patrols in the Straits of
Malacca.
Its smaller, faster, and more maneuverable cousin, the Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS), may one day sail through an open door, but its
ultra-modern, stealthy, and lethal mien, to say nothing of its 400-foot
length, will likely still prove too imposing for Malaysia and Indonesia
at the outset. 38 8 It would, however, be an ideal vessel off the coast of
Somalia, especially since it can exist for extended periods of time on
the high seas; deploy SEALs; provide intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), especially through the use of helicopters and
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unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and reach speeds in excess of fortyseven knots. 38 9 It is also very cheap "by Navy standards. 3 90
For constabulary missions in the Straits of Malacca, what really
matters is the personnel more than the vessel. A complement of
Marines or SEALs on smaller, faster (and obviously far less
expensive) armored patrol boats would be the ideal anti-piracy and
anti-maritime terrorism weapon. Special Forces could also undertake
the opposed boardings and the hostage situations which normal
VBSS teams could not.
In July 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore announced
joint patrols using commandos, frigates, and swift patrol boats. 391 At
the launch ceremony, General Endriartono Suarto, Indonesia's top
military commander, left the door open for nations beyond the
original trio to join their "Neighbourhood Watch": "Now there are
many countries having a [sic] interest in the security of the Strait of
Malacca. We lack ships, so probably if they have ships they can offer
help to us. We lack detecting skills, while they have such abilities, so
'392
they can complement us.
Thus, the United States has a golden opportunity to provide that
assistance, so long as its vessels and detection abilities speak softly
and carry that big stick.
B. Regional Courts
A great complement to regional enforcement would be regional
adjudication. Instead of an ad hoc trial of ten suspected Somali
pirates in a Mombasa court with scant judicial resources, a
tremendous backlog of cases, a magistrate who is forced to transcribe
witness testimony by hand, and prosecutors without sufficient time
and resources to adequately prepare their witness, the pirates could
have been tried in a regional piracy court. That specialized court,
properly designed, would have enjoyed the benefits of economies of
scale in resources, knowledge, and experience. It could also provide
benefits in three other areas.
As Professor William Burke-White has pioneered, regional
adjudication offers an attractive alternative to the two traditional
international law enforcement mechanisms of supranational
tribunals (e.g., the International Criminal Court), and the
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domestication of international law in national courts (e.g., through
universal jurisdiction). 393 A regional piracy court in coastal Africa
and another in Asia would combine the advantages of both traditional
mechanisms, while minimizing their disadvantages, to form what
394
Burke-White calls an "ideal compromise."
First, a piracy court situated in Kenya, for example, could draw
on the legal experience of the region, ensuring that judges and
attorneys have sufficient training and experience in international and
maritime law. Such a court would also be able to pool resources from
across the entire region and be capable of receiving specifically
earmarked funds from the international community, thereby making
it even more attractive to affected states. The court need not even be
an actual courtroom, only a circuit judge or judges with a dedicated
support staff of court reporters, clerks, and funds. Thus, no matter
where the proceeding were held, the trial would, for example, enjoy
actual court transcription.
Second, a piracy court could also develop and utilize the most
efficient and fair rules of evidence and procedure, especially in light of
the unique nature of law enforcement on the high seas. Naval
constabulary missions have a peculiar set of challenges that need to
be considered. Sometimes those challenges require that life-at-sea
take precedence over the sanctity of the case. For example, the
NASSAU took into its well deck a pirate skiff full of weapons and
other evidence. Unfortunately, the skiff was also full of "roaches the
size of leopards and all manner of other pestilence," as well as other
biohazards pooling on its base. 395 Great care was taken to photodocument everything prior to jettisoning the skiff for health reasons.
At trial, however, none of those photos were admissible without
calling the personnel who actually took them. Doing so would have
involved sending numerous people to Kenya, costing large sums of
money and negatively impacting operations. As discussed above, the
U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence, which only require authentication,
could serve as a model for a piracy court's evidentiary guidelines.
Additionally, evidentiary rules such as Kenya's proscription against
admitting photocopies could be updated. Most important, as they do
in many nations (but not in Kenya), rules against self-incrimination
could leave room for the admissibility of knowing, willing, and
voluntary admissions, so long as strict procedural and substantive
rules are followed.
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Third, the regional court also reinforces the view, critical to
nations like Somalia, of the effectiveness and attractiveness of the
rule of law, while diminishing the risks that the rule of law be seen as
a U.S. or Western imposition. 396 With respect to sub-Saharan Africa,
South Africa could take the lead in this regional effort, furthering its
regionalist project to "bind the region together under South African
leadership," and furthering Thabo Mbeki's goal of bringing "to an end
the practices as a result of which many throughout the world have
the view that as Africans, we are incapable of establishing and
397
maintaining systems of good governance."
Fourth, regional cooperation in adjudication could limit
jurisdictional conflicts among nations. While under UNCLOS the
capturing state gets to decide upon disposition, there is no guarantee
that it wants to undertake such an obligation (as the United States
did not), and it may be that no other neighboring nation is willing
either. Alternatively, nations may fight over the right to prosecute.
Extending universal jurisdiction over only those who "acknowledge
the authority of no State," 398 may have been "shorthand for the idea
that [universal jurisdiction] only applies when it will not lead to
interstate conflict because other nations will not stand up for the
defendants," 399 but there are many states that may want to stand up
for the victims. There are also states, like Kenya, who may want to
stand up for their economic and strategic interests.
Currently, however, there are no set rules for resolving such
jurisdictional conflicts. Under universal jurisdiction any nation may
prosecute-so long as it has the appropriate domestic legislation-but
it does not provide guidance as to the nation that should or must
prosecute. Thus, when Augusto Pinochet was arrested in the United
Kingdom in 1999, there was no clear hierarchy of jurisdiction to
determine which state seeking extradition was entitled to prosecute
him. The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction is an
attempt by leading scholars in international law to develop a set of
principles for prioritizing claims under universal jurisdiction. The
Principles direct states to resolve jurisdictional conflicts based on:
an aggregate balance of . . . (a) multilateral or bilateral treaty
obligations; (b) the place of commission of the crime; (c) the nationality
connection of the alleged perpetrator to the requesting state; (d) the
nationality connection of the victim to the requesting state; (e) any
other connection between the requesting state and the alleged
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perpetrator, the crime, or the victim; (f) the likelihood, good faith, and
effectiveness of the prosecution in the requesting state; (g) the fairness
and impartiality of the proceedings in the requesting state; (h)
convenience to the parties and witnesses, as well as the availability of
400
evidence in the requesting state; and (i) the interests of justice.

Regional adjudication agreements could go a long way to
resolving jurisdictional disputes and could supplement the prosecuteor-extradite provisions of the SUA Convention. Regional adjudication
also allows nations to either share the glory of prosecution, or
distance themselves, as appropriate.
This last consideration is
especially important when prosecutions involve more politically
active and visible defendants. Such courts are best established at the
regional level via resolutions, such as from African Union summits, or
via bi- or multi-lateral treaties.

VI.

CONCLUSION

None the less [sic], he knew that the tale he had to tell could not be one
of a final victory. It could be only the record of what had had to be done,
and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never ending
fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal
afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow
401
down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers.

Military planning, like litigation, is a chess game-success
depends on seeing many moves in advance. Thus, it should be
surprising that when military operations and litigation are joined, as
they are during naval constabulary missions, this maxim remains
true. A complete legal theory with its political, military, and due
process implications is an essential component of any successful
strategy.
Since, and perhaps because of, the demise of the Soviet Union,
asymmetric and law-enforcement type threats have dominated the
strategic landscape. All indications are that they will continue to do
so in the near term. The lessons of history have proven that fighting
the previous war is a sure way to struggle in, if not lose, the current
one. The United States should embrace maritime security operations
and seek to equip and accommodate the new mission to the fullest
extent possible. As this Article has demonstrated, maritime law
enforcement cannot be an ancillary capacity, and anti-piracy cannot
be an ad hoc adventure. Anti-piracy, and especially anti-piratical
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terrorism, is part and parcel of an effective global strategy, integral
facets that could help tremendously in the war on terror or just as
easily hurt it.

